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INTRODUCTION
In the public discourse, the perceived intent of those who disclose
national security information without authorization plays an impor-
tant role in whether they are labeled as heroes or traitors.1 Should
it matter whether Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning leaked gov-
ernment information to WikiLeaks knowing that our enemies might
benefit from the information? Is it relevant that Edward Snowden
believed—or that a reasonable person would believe—that the top-
secret government surveillance programs he revealed were illegal,
or that the public value in knowing about these programs out-
weighed any risk of harm to national security? This Article exam-
ines whether intent—and what kind of intent— should matter in
defining crimes related to the disclosure of national security
information and concludes that it should, both as a matter of public
policy and as a matter of constitutional law.
Although strict liability for the unauthorized collection and
dissemination of all defense-related information might be the safest
way to protect our nation’s security,2 such an approach would be in-
consistent with our basic commitment to an informed democracy.
The difficulty is in balancing the competing interests at stake.
Incorporating mens rea requirements is a potentially useful way to
strike the appropriate balance. Indeed, mens rea requirements are
used throughout criminal law to differentiate among actors based
on their moral blameworthiness and already play a very important
role in defining and limiting criminal liability in this area. The
current statutory regime—as convoluted and confusing as it
is—treats the transmission of national security information with the
intent to aid the enemy or a foreign government much more severely
1. See, e.g., Suzanna Andrews et al., The Snowden Saga: A Shadowland of Secrets and
Light, VANITY FAIR (May 2014), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/ 2014/05/edward-
snowden-politics-interview [http://perma.cc/6JRG-HFZA] (“Whether hero or traitor, former
National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden is the most important whistle-blower
of modern times.”). For a more extensive discussion of this “name game,” see Mary-Rose
Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security Leaks and the First
Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 450-53 (2014).
2. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and the Publication
of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 1083 (1973).
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than other types of unauthorized disclosures.3 As the U.S. Supreme
Court has explicitly recognized, “innocence of intention will defeat
a charge even of treason.”4 Disclosures made with “bad” intent—for
example, to aid one of our enemies or to harm the United States—
are entitled to greater moral condemnation and punishment.5
It is less clear whether the First Amendment requires any consid-
eration of intent when determining which disclosures of national
security information can be punished. Surprisingly, the role of in-
tent in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has received
little scholarly attention.6 Even less explored is the more specific
question of the role of intent with respect to First Amendment
protection for the disclosure and publication of national security
3. 18 U.S.C. § 794(a)-(b) (2012) (authorizing up to life in prison and the death penalty for
those who gather or deliver national security information to any foreign government or enemy
“with the intent or reason to believe” that it “is to be used to the injury of the United States
or advantage of a foreign nation”).
4. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 262 n.21 (1952) (citing Haupt v. United
States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945)); id. at 265
(“[T]reason—the one crime deemed grave enough for definition in our Constitution
itself—requires not only the duly witnessed overt act of aid and comfort to the enemy but also
the mental element of disloyalty or adherence to the enemy.”).
5. Government officials frequently argue that motivation is irrelevant because
information disclosed with the intent of informing public debate will end up in our enemies
hands, causing the same harm as information delivered directly to our enemies. See Edgar
& Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 942; see also Papandrea, supra note 1, at 450 n.2-3
(summarizing various government statements suggesting that any leak to the press is the
equivalent of aiding the enemy).
6. See Larry Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker’s Intent, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 21, 21-22
(1995) (arguing against using intent in First Amendment jurisprudence because no matter
what the author intended, audiences will receive it differently); Larry Alexander, Low Value
Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548, 552 n.19 (1989) (stating that the problem with using the
speaker’s intent is that the value of speech is derived from the audience’s interpretation of the
speech, not the speaker’s intent); Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First
Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 199 (“[Q]uestions about the
relevance of speaker’s intent, although pervasively important in free speech analysis, have
rarely surfaced explicitly in either the case law or the literature.”). But see Leslie Kendrick,
Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 1255-56 (2014) (arguing that First
Amendment law considers the speaker’s intent and demonstrating how and why the speaker’s
intent matters). It is likely that more scholars will focus on the role of intent in determining
the scope of First Amendment protection now that the U.S. Supreme Court will be deciding
whether a defendant must subjectively intend for his communication to be perceived as intim-
idating in order for his speech to constitute a “true threat,” an unprotected category of speech.
See United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2819
(2014).
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information.7 Although many scholars have suggested that intent
should play a role in the badly needed revision of the Espionage Act
and related statutes, the literature lacks a vigorous study of why in-
tent should matter, what the relevant intent requirements should
be, and whether any of these requirements are constitutionally
required.8 This Article focuses on these questions.
7. The best analysis of the culpability standards in the current federal statutes relating
to the collection, retention, and dissemination of national security information is Harold Ed-
gar and Benno Schmidt’s seminal article on the Espionage Act statutes. See Edgar & Schmidt,
Jr., supra note 2. Because they conclude that “the central issues are legislative,” however, this
Article does not focus on whether the First Amendment requires any particular culpability
standards. Id. at 930 (“The first amendment provides restraints against grossly sweeping pro-
hibitions, but it does not, we believe, deprive Congress of considerable latitude in reconciling
the conflict between basic values of speech and security.”); id. at 1044-46 (arguing that
construing § 793(d) and (e) of the Espionage Act to take the defendant’s motives into account
would help avoid a potential “[c]onstitutional dilemma[ ]” of criminalizing speech protected
under the First Amendment). That said, I am tremendously grateful for the many insights
they offer throughout their article regarding the proper balance between protecting our
national security and securing free debate. 
8. See, e.g., Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 66-69 (2010) [hereinafter Espio-
nage Act Hearing] (statement of Stephen I. Vladeck, Professor of Law, American University
Washington College of Law), available at http://perma.cc/6X6X-JS7U (suggesting that Con-
gress add to the Espionage Act “a clear and precise specific intent requirement that constrains
the scope of the Espionage Act to cases where the defendant specifically intends the disclosure
to harm national security and/or to benefit a foreign power,” and a separate, lesser crime for
other disclosures with “the availability of any number of affirmative defenses that the
disclosure was in good faith; that the information was improperly classified; that the informa-
tion was already in the public domain; and/or that the public good resulting from the disclo-
sure outweighs the potential harm to national security”); Patricia Bellia, WikiLeaks and the
Institutional Framework for National Security Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448, 1523 (2012)
(suggesting that Congress “distinguish between disclosures undertaken with intent to harm
the United States or benefit a foreign nation, disclosures undertaken with reckless disregard
for this risk, and disclosures undertaken in bad faith and where the leaker knew or had rea-
son to know that disclosure would pose significant national security risks”); Yochai Benkler,
A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers and Whistleblowers, 8 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 305 (2014) (arguing for a public accountability defense requiring a
defendant to demonstrate an objectively reasonable belief that his disclosure would expose
“a substantial violation of law or systemic error, incompetence, or malfeasance” and suggest-
ing the subjective motivation is irrelevant, as well as any ultimate determination regarding
the legality of the disclosed government activities); Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information
Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 928 (arguing it is essential to “preserve[ ]”
the intent requirement in cases against government outsiders because it “safeguards against
punishments based on mere policy disagreements over secrecy and openness”); Heidi
Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First Amendment Protec-
tions for Leakers of Classified information, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 409, 441 (2013) (arguing
that the First Amendment protects leakers from severe sanctions when they had an “objec-
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Part I surveys the current role of intent in the notoriously
convoluted Espionage Act and related statutes. This overview of
Congress’s struggle to protect the freedom of speech while punishing
spies and others who harm our national security interests is useful
on several levels. These statutes as well as their legislative histories
demonstrate that the idea of using intent standards to distinguish
between speech that should be protected and speech deserving of
punishment is hardly a new idea. As with many other federal stat-
utes, however, Congress’s use of intent standards in the existing
statutory framework is clumsy and vague. As a result, courts inter-
preting these laws disagree about what level of culpability is re-
quired. Furthermore, these statutes illustrate the common problem
of using intent standards to draw distinctions among acts that may
cause similar harms.9 At the same time, however, Congress’s
tively reasonable basis to believe that the public interest in disclosure outweighed identifiable
national security harms” and from less severe sanctions when leakers have an “objectively
substantial basis to believe that the public interest in disclosure outweighed identifiable
national security harms”); David McCraw & Stephen Gikow, The End to an Unspoken Bar-
gain?, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 473 (2013) (“There is ... a case to be made that intent should
matter—those who publish with knowing intent to harm can be distinguished from those who
publish with a good-faith belief that they are advancing public knowledge and debate.”);
Derigan A. Silver, National Security and the Press: The Government’s Ability to Prosecute
Journalists for the Possession or Publication of National Security Information, 13 COMM. L.
& POL’Y 447, 483 (2008) (calling on Congress to amend the Espionage Act statutes “to limit
prosecution to instances when there is evidence of intent to harm the United States”);
Geoffrey Stone, Government Security v. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 185,
196 (2007) (arguing that the First Amendment offers no protection to government employees
who disclose information about a national security program the employee “reasonably but
wrongly believed to be unlawful”); Christina E. Wells, Contextualizing Disclosure’s Effects:
WikiLeaks, Balancing, and the First Amendment, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 51, 63 (2012),
http://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/files/ilr.law.uiowa.edu/files/ILRB_97_Wells.pdf [http://perma.cc/SSP9-
KRB9] (arguing for a revised “judicial test” that “require[s] strong evidentiary showings, clear
intent requirements, and other protections to ensure that balancing does not routinely work
to the detriment of those who disclose information for nonespionage purposes”); see also
Candice Kines, Note, Aiding the Enemy or Promoting Democracy? Defining the Rights of
Journalists and Whistleblowers, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 735, 778-79 (2013) (arguing for the amend-
ment of the Espionage Act to protect disclosures of national security made with the good-faith
intention to promote public awareness of an act “perceived to be illegal or unjust”); Eric A.
Posner, Before You Reboot the NSA, Think About This, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 6, 2013), http://
www.newrepublic.com/article/115291/rahul-sagars-secret-leaks-reviewed-eric-posner
[http://perma.cc/4R5F-2BKN] (stating that “nearly all members of the intelligentsia—
journalists, pundits, university professors” believe that “[w]histle-blowers should not be
prosecuted when they mean well and disclose wrongdoing”).
9. See Note, Mens Rea in Federal Criminal Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2402, 2402 (1998)
(lamenting the “confused and inconsistent ad hoc approach” of courts interpreting mens rea
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persistentuse of intent requirements to determine which disclosures
are criminalized and which ones are not is instructive, offering use-
ful lines of inquiry regarding how mens rea requirements could be
used in this context.
Part II examines the often controversial role of intent in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and concludes
that even if Congress declines to incorporate intent into the statu-
tory framework for national security information disclosures, such
intent standards may be constitutionally required. Mens rea stan-
dards are an extraordinarily useful means of distinguishing between
espionage, which can be said to serve no constructive purpose, and
leaks, which often make meaningful contributions to public debate.
In addition, intent standards can be used not just as a means of de-
marking protected speech and unprotected speech but also as way
of determining the severity of the crime. Furthermore, culpability
standards offer a particularly promising means of dealing with the
problem of “dual use” speech, which is speech that can be either
helpful or harmful. The unauthorized disclosures of national secur-
ity information fall within this category because they can both make
a meaningful contribution to the public debate and threaten our
national security.
Part III addresses the likely objections to the use of intent stan-
dards to draw distinctions between protected and unprotected dis-
closures. Among other things, this portion of the Article explains
that in determining a speaker’s intent, courts are not required to
in federal criminal statutes) (citation omitted). The Court has particularly struggled to
interpret federal statutes that contain no mens rea requirements at all, especially when the
crimes are not public welfare offenses and the statutorily authorized punishment is severe.
In several cases, the Court has read mens rea requirements into federal statutes in order to
avoid criminalizing “apparently innocent conduct.” See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 65-66, 68-69 (1994) (extending a mens rea requirement to additional
elements of the criminal statute despite the statute’s plain textual reading); Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 602, 605-06 (1994) (incorporating a mens rea requirement into the
federal statute penalizing the failure to register certain types of firearms); Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (interpreting a federal criminal law relating to misuse of food
stamps); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (interpreting a federal
embezzlement statute). But see United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922) (declining
to read a mens rea requirement into a federal drug law provision after concluding that
Congress had “weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty
against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug, and concluded that
the latter was the result preferably to be avoided”).
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accept a defendant’s potentially self-serving explanations for his
speech, but instead can consider a variety of contextual clues to de-
termine the legitimacy of those assertions.
Before I begin, a few caveats are in order. This Article rests on a
number of background assumptions that some readers might regard
as controversial. To begin, this Article takes it as a given that the
overclassification of national security information is rampant, and
as a result the classification status of a document should not be
absolutely determinative regarding the value of the information or
the need for secrecy. As Judge Skelly Wright said in his dissent
from the D.C. Circuit’s decision to grant the government’s request
for a prior restraint in United States v. Washington Post Co., “To al-
low a government to suppress free speech simply through a system
of bureaucratic classification would sell our heritage, far, far too
cheaply.”10 Furthermore, this Article takes as a given that leaks of
classified information are an essential part of our democracy. In
some ways, the resulting “game of leaks” serves both the govern-
ment, which uses leaks to control the flow of information for its own
purposes, and the press, which may benefit financially and other-
wise from its ability to expose and decipher national security se-
crets. In my prior work,11 I have explored the various problems with
the classification system, the lack of effective whistleblower
protections for national security employees, the symbiotic relation-
ship between the press and the executive branch, and the role of
leaks as an effective check on the political branches; I do not set out
to prove them all here again.
Similarly, this Article does not address arguments that gov-
ernment insiders who reveal national security information are
10. 446 F.2d 1322, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting). The quotation is worth
setting out in full:
With the sweep of a rubber stamp labelled “top secret,” the executive
department seeks to abridge the freedom of the press. It has offered no more. We
are asked to turn our backs on the First Amendment simply because certain
officials have labelled material as unfit for the American people and the people
of the world. Surely, we must demand more. To allow a government to suppress
free speech simply through a system of bureaucratic classification would sell our
heritage, far, far too cheaply.
Id.
11. See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and
National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 248-49 (2008); Papandrea, supra note 1. 
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engaging in “conduct” and not “speech” (as the government has
argued in litigation); that government employees have waived their
First Amendment rights by signing contracts agreeing not to reveal
classified information; or that government insiders have no First
Amendment right to reveal information they obtained during the
course of their employment. All of these arguments are important
to address, but because I have addressed them elsewhere,12 I will
not repeat my analysis here.
Some readers may question the value of this project given that
the law may very well play a small role in decisions about what in-
formation is kept secret and what information is disclosed and pub-
lished. Although traditional journalists frequently claim that their
publication decisions are based on a determination of the informa-
tion’s public value, as well as the potential harm that the disclosure
of the information might cause, the law does not expressly acknowl-
edge the value of the information to the public.13 The government
likewise has never prosecuted a news organization for disclosing
national security information.14 The decision not to prosecute may
have little to do with the applicable standard the government would
have to satisfy and more to do with an evaluation of other issues,
like concerns about graymail15 and public resistance to prosecutions.
Nevertheless, we must keep in mind the culture of secrecy and
loyalty that is pervasive in the national security infrastructure in
this country.  Leakers face not only the risk that the First Amend-
ment will not in fact protect their disclosures, even under the ap-
proach this Article suggests, but also a whole host of personal and
professional incentives not to leak. Furthermore, recent revela-
tions regarding the government’s surveillance of national security
12. See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 514-17, 520-28.
13. McCraw & Gikow, supra note 8 (“[W]hat is ‘striking’ ... is the absence of any attempt
to integrate consideration of the public interest into the applicable legal framework—whether
as a defense for a leaker, or as a basis for requiring disclosure of national security information
through FOIA, or for determining whether a publisher should be subject to a prior restraint
or post-publication penalty.”). 
14. Stone, supra note 8, at 186.
15. Azar v. Ashcroft 585 F.3d 559, 578-79 (2d Cir. 2009) (“ ‘[G]raymail ... [is] individual
lawsuits brought to induce the [government] to settle a case (or prevent its filing) out of fear
that any effort to litigate the action would reveal classified information that may undermine
ongoing covert operations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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reporters16 and prosecutors’ willingness to use subpoenas to compel
reporters (like James Risen) to reveal their sources17 indicate that
some protection for the underlying leaks is essential. In addition,
the dramatic increase in the number of leak prosecutions, the poten-
tial for the dissemination of leaked national security information by
nontraditional organizations like WikiLeaks, and the growing chil-
ling effect of the government’s crackdown on leaks on the free flow
of information to the American public, all render the topic of this
Article crucially important.18
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
For over a century Congress has struggled to balance the need for
an informed public with legitimate national security demands for
secrecy. The various statutes criminalizing the unauthorized
dissemination and publication of national security information
reflect this struggle. Reading the current statutes to determine the
applicable culpability standards in the existing statutory framework
is not an easy job. It does not help that judicial guidance is in short
supply. Despite the recent rise in the number of leak prosecutions,
the number of leak prosecutions overall remains rather small.19 In
addition, the government has never prosecuted a traditional news
organization.20 As a result, courts have had rather few opportunities
to interpret the relevant statutes. Nevertheless, intent plays a
significant role in the current statutory regime, and the legislative
history makes clear that this was no accident. Congress believed
16. Report Finds NSA Surveillance Harming Journalism and Law, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION (July 28, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/human-rights-national-security/report-finds-nsa-
surveillance-harming-journalism-and-law [http://perma.cc/3WZD-Y4S3].
17. Jonathan Mahler, Reporter’s Case Poses Dilemma for Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES (June
27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/28/us/case-of-james-risen-times-reporter-poses-
dilemma-for-justice-department.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/Z6HV-XSEE].
18. Report Finds NSA Surveillance Harming Journalism and Law, supra note 16.
19. Cora Currier, Charting Obama’s Crackdown on National Security Leaks, PROPUBLICA
(July 30, 2013, 3:40 PM), http://www.propublica.org/special/sealing-loose-lips-charting-
obamas-crackdown-on-national-security-leaks [http://perma.cc/6X7F-77V9] (stating that prior
to the Obama administration only three leaks were prosecuted under the Espionage Act, and
although the administration has aggressively pursued national security leakers, it has
brought only seven cases under the Espionage Act).
20. Espionage Act Hearing, supra note 8, at 39-40 (statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein,
Partner, O’Melveny & Myers, LLP); Stone, supra note 8, at 186.
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intent standards could be a meaningful way to distinguish among
different types of disclosures based on their blameworthiness.21
Prosecutors can—and have—used a wide variety of criminal stat-
utes to prosecute leakers beyond those discussed in detail in this
Part, and these statutes use various intent standards. This Article
focuses on the statutes that were enacted specifically with the aim
of criminalizing the unauthorized disclosure of national security
information because these statutes are the ones in which Congress
explicitly considered when such disclosures should be punished.
A. Treason
Treason is a specific intent crime. The Supreme Court has explic-
itly stated that “treason—the one crime deemed grave enough for
definition in our Constitution itself—requires not only the duly
witnessed overt act of aid and comfort to the enemy but also the
mental element of disloyalty or adherence to the enemy.”22 Treason
thus has two elements: aid and comfort to the enemy,23 and adher-
ence to the enemy.
The “aid and comfort” element does not require the government
to prove that the attempt to assist the enemy was substantial, com-
plete, effective, or successful.24 In cases involving the transmission
of information, U.S. courts have made clear that it is not necessary
for the government to demonstrate that the enemy made use of the
information,25 or as in one case, that the information was even
21. See infra Part I.A.1.
22. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 265 (1952); see id. at 262 n.21 (“[I]nnocence
of intention will defeat a charge even of treason.” (citing Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631
(1947))); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 62 (1945).
23. “Enemy” is not defined in the Constitution, but the Court has said that the term
includes “subjects or citizens of a foreign State at war with our own.” The Prize Cases, 67 U.S.
(2 Black) 635, 672 (1863). Some scholars have argued that a group like Al Qaeda constitutes
the “enemy” because “Al Qaeda has engaged in violent, war-like attacks on the United States.”
Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant
Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 920 (2006).
24. See Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 738-39 (1952); Haupt, 330 U.S. at 644;
United States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18, 24 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863) (No. 15,254) (“It is not
essential, to constitute the giving of aid and comfort, that the enterprise commenced should
be successful, and actually render assistance.”).
25. See Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 941 (1st Cir. 1948).
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received.26 The Court’s treason cases do not expressly require one to
act with the enemy’s consent or have any sort of direct relationship
with the enemy; although in all of the treason cases, the defendants
did serve as agents of the enemy.27 Requiring some sort of direct re-
lationship, agreement, or arrangement with the enemy would seem
essential to avoid a dramatic expansion of the Treason Clause.28 Any
number of actions can aid the enemy—from sabotaging a weapons
plant to criticizing the United States—but unless the act is done at
the behest or at least in cooperation with the enemy, calling the act
“treason” seems incorrect.29
Although it is not clear that an actor’s subjective intent to direct
his actions to the enemy plays a role in determining whether he has
provided aid and comfort, the Court has held that such intent is
essential in determining whether the individual “adhered” to the
enemy. For example, in Haupt v. United States, the Court affirmed
the treason conviction of a German saboteur’s father during World
War II, but suggested that permitting the jury to consider whether
the defendant had benign motives for extending aid to the enemy
was appropriate.30 The trial court in Haupt instructed the jury that
the intent element was not met if the father provided assistance to
his son “as an individual, as distinguished from assisting him in his
purpose, if such existed, of aiding the German Reich, or of injuring
the United States.”31 The Supreme Court explained that it was up
to the jury to weigh the evidence regarding the father’s motivations
for assisting his son, which included the defendant’s argument that
he was just trying to assist his offspring.32 The jury in Haupt ulti-
mately found the father guilty.33 The Court affirmed the conviction,
26. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. at 24 (explaining that sending a letter to the enemy that
contains intelligence constitutes giving aid and comfort, even if the letter is intercepted before
delivery).
27. See Tom W. Bell, Treason, Technology, and the Freedom of Expression, 37 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 999, 1014-15 (2005).
28. See id. at 1031-32 (discussing the effects of this approach on a hypothetical defendant
who might be subject to treason prosecution for posting criticism of U.S. military policy).
29. See id. at 1033 (“Taken at face value, the law reaches all disloyal public criticism of
U.S. military policy made by those who owe allegiance to the U.S.... Yet it is inconceivable
that all such expressions would trigger prosecutions for treason.”).
30. 330 U.S. 631, 641 (1947).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 644.
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reasoning that the jury could have reasonably determined that the
father did have intent to betray the United States, given several
statements he made indicating his “adherence to the German
cause.”34 Haupt seems to indicate that juries are entitled to consider
a broad range of factors when determining whether a defendant
acted with the requisite intent to betray, including circumstantial
evidence as well as the act itself, but the jury must ultimately
conclude that the defendant acted with a specific intent to betray.
Although treason prosecutions are extremely rare and generally
unnecessary in light of other, less stringent statutory provisions
that can be used to prosecute the same behavior, the requirement
that the government must demonstrate the defendant’s specific in-
tent to adhere to the enemy indicates that culpability requirements
can play a useful role in determining the moral blameworthiness of
those who disclosure national security information without authori-
zation.
For disclosures to WikiLeaks, Corporal Chelsea (Bradley) Man-
ning was prosecuted under Article 104 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.35 This law is similar to constitutional treason in
many ways, including the availablility of the death penalty as a
punishment. Indeed, courts frequently treat military treason as the
rough equivalent of civil treason cases, even applying a two-witness
rule that the relevant statute does not require.36 The Military Court
of Appeals has held that Article 104 is a general, and not specific,
intent crime because it simply requires a defendant to “knowingly”
communicate with the enemy.37 Nevertheless, even this intent
requirement can play an important limiting role. In the Manning
34. Id. at 641-42.
35. 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2012). This provision defines the crime as follows:
Any person who—
(1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, money,
or other things; or
(2) without proper authority, knowingly harbors or protects or gives intelligence
to, or communicates or corresponds with or holds any intercourse with the
enemy, either directly or indirectly;
shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial or military
commission may direct.
Id.
36. See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 505.
37. United States v. Batchelor, 22 C.M.R. 144, 158 (C.M.A. 1956) (“Article 104(2) of the
Code does not require specific criminal intent of any sort.”).
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prosecution, the government contended that this requirement was
satisfied as long as Manning knew that the communications could
reach the enemy, even if that was not Manning’s primary intent.38
Although the trial court rejected the argument that the government
had to prove that Manning had specific intent to reach the enemy,39
the court nevertheless entered a verdict in Manning’s favor.40 The
reasons for the court’s ruling remain unclear,41 but it is possible that
the court was concerned about the troubling constitutional ques-
tions the government’s position raised. After all, under the govern-
ment’s approach, an actor is subject to an Article 104(a) prosecu-
tion—and the death penalty—whenever he has reason to believe
that the enemy reads our publications.
B. The Espionage Act
The Espionage Act, codified as §§ 793-798 in Title 18 of the U.S.
Code, comprises some of the most confusing and ambiguous federal
criminal law on the books.42 Despite its title, courts agree that the
various provisions of the Espionage Act punish much more than
traditional espionage.43 Not only do some provisions apply to
government insiders who disclose national security information to
the press, but some also appear to leave open the possibility of
38. See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 506, 507 & n.388.
39. See id. at 507 & n.389.
40. See id. at 507 & n.393.
41. Id. at 507; see also Charlie Savage, Manning Found Not Guilty of Aiding the Enemy,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2013, at Al. Because Manning's lawyers requested specific findings only
with respect to the charges for which Manning was found guilty, the judge did not explain the
basis for acquitting Manning of the article 104(2) charge in the written findings she issued
after announcing her decision. See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 507 & n.393.
42. See, e.g., Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 934 (“[T]he legislation is in many
respects incomprehensible.”); Anthony Lewis, National Security: Muting the “Vital Criticism,”
34 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1698 (1987) (“The espionage sections of the Federal Criminal Code are
a singularly impenetrable warren of provisions originally passed by Congress under the
stresses of World War I.” (footnote omitted)); Stephen I. Vladeck, Inchoate Liability and the
Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 219, 222 (2007) (noting that the Espionage Act contains “a number of seemingly
overlapping and often ambiguous provisions”).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1063-64 (4th Cir. 1988) (relying on
the statute’s plain language when holding that 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)-(e) could be applied to
charges based on the defendant’s disclosure of information to the press).
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prosecutions against the press itself, as well as any other down-
stream publishers (including ordinary citizens).
The United States does not have the equivalent of the United
Kingdom’s Official Secrets Act that broadly criminalizes all disclo-
sures of classified information.44 In reality, however, the current
statutory framework gives the government vast authority to prose-
cute both government insiders and outsiders for the unauthorized
retention or disclosure of classified information.45
Although calls to revise these statutes have persisted for decades,
Congress has not reformed them, perhaps because “[t]he effort to
clarify would have required firm answers to too many difficult
questions.”46 Consequently, prosecutorial discretion and judicial
interpretation have filled in the gaps.47 Courts have struggled to
interpret the scienter requirements for many of its provisions. As
Harold Edgar and Benno Schmidt remarked in their landmark
article examining the legislative history, “the proponents of culpa-
bility standards [in the Espionage Act] were more concerned with
containing their inclusion than elucidating their meaning,”48 and as
a result, the existing statutes contain “cumbersome and opaque
descriptions of mental states.”49
1. Sections 793 and 794
Sections 793 and 794 are the heart of the Espionage Act of 1917,
passed shortly after the United States entered World War I.50 
44. Official Secrets Act, 1989, c. 6 (U.K.), available at http://perma.cc./WJA4-B72T.
45. See Vladeck, supra note 42, at 221-27.
46. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power
and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 357 (1986).
47. See id. at 358 & n.20 (noting that the result of Congress’s failure to answer the
difficult questions is that the Executive is permitted to “carefully choos[e] attractive targets
without any declaration of principle and under vaguely enunciated legal norms”). For
example, one court upheld the prosecution of a civil mathematician under § 793(f)(2), which
criminalizes the failure of someone entrusted with national defense documents or information
“to make prompt report of such loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction [of such material] to his
superior officer,” even though the defendant was not in the military or government service
and did not have a “superior officer.” United States v. Dedeyan, 584 F.2d 36, 37 n.1, 40 (4th
Cir. 1978) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 793(f)(2) (1976)).
48. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 942.
49. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 46, at 407.
50. Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended at
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Derived from the Defense of Secrets Act of 1911, much of the
legislative history focuses on reactions to President Wilson’s desire
for legislation that would permit him to censor or punish the publi-
cation of national security information and to expand the govern-
ment’s power to punish the gathering and retention of national
security information.51 Concerns about the dissemination of import-
ant national security information to the enemy through the newspa-
pers was squarely in the minds of those advocating for these broad
powers.52
The legislative history indicates that Congress attempted to limit
the government’s ability to prosecute well-meaning individuals
through mens rea standards.53 Unfortunately, the culpability stan-
dard appearing most frequently in these statutes is that the
defendant acted with the “intent” or “reason to believe” that the na-
tional security information “is to be used” or “could be used” to harm
the United States or benefit a foreign nation.54 It is unclear whether
this standard requires the government to prove that the defendant
acted with the purpose of harming the United States—a standard
that would protect those with benign motives—or whether the
“reason to believe” standard permits prosecutions based on reckless-
ness or even negligence.55
a. Section 793
The first two provisions of § 793 are aimed at the collecting and
copying of national defense information.56 Congress’s primary
concern appears to have been the collection of information by agents
of foreign governments, but the resulting statute is not, on its face,
so limited.57 Section 793(a) focuses on various categories of physical
locations like dockyards, railroads, factories, research laboratories,
18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (2012)).
51. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 940-41.
52. Id. at 941 (noting that sponsors cited the publication of military plans in newspapers
during the Civil War).
53. Id.
54. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794. Between the two sections, “intent” appears four times and
“reason to believe” appears six times. Id.
55. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 942.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a)-(b).
57. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 970.
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and other places “connected with national defense” and at these
locations, criminalizes the collection of “information respecting the
national defense with intent or reason to believe that the informa-
tion is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the
advantage of any foreign nation.”58 Section 793(b) criminalizes the
copying, taking, making, or obtaining of various documents, like
blueprints, photographic negatives, and maps “of anything con-
nected with the national defense” when it is done “for the purpose
aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe.”59
Despite objections that “information respecting the national
defense” is a potentially limitless category, including “every part ...
of the national economy and everything tending to disclose the
national mind,”60 Congress rejected attempts to limit the scope of
the statute to specifically named places or specific categories of
information because of concerns that such an approach would not
adequately protect sensitive information.61 Instead, Congress added
a scienter requirement, which limited the application of the statute
to instances in which the defendant has the “intent or reason to
believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United
States, or to the advantage of a foreign nation.”62
By adding culpability requirements, Congress hoped to protect
those who acted with the intent of engaging in public debate on
national security issues.63 Indeed, despite the plain language of the
statute, some representatives believed that the law would apply
only to those with “a conscious purpose to injure” the United
States.64 As Edgar and Schmidt noted, “The legislative history is
replete with declarations that ‘evil purpose’ is required to violate
58. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a).
59. Id. § 793(b) (“Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to
believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts to copy, take, make, or obtain, any
sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument,
appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense.”). It
is not clear why Congress included the language “for the purpose aforesaid” as well as “like
intent or reason to believe.” The “purpose aforesaid” must be referring to the immediately
prior subsection, § 793(a), but that provision does not contain any additional scienter
requirements aside from the “intent or reason to believe” standard. Id. § 793(a).
60. United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 815 (2d Cir. 1945).
61. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 972.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a)-(b).
63. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 991.
64. Id. at 995-96.
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these laws.”65 The congressional record contains little indication,
however, of whether Congress meant by this “intent or reason to
believe” requirement that the offender had to intend to harm the
United States or benefit a foreign power, or whether it “is to be
inferred from action when occurrence of the result is a virtual
certainty.”66 Arguably, the culpability standard is mere negligence,
or at most recklessness.67
It does not appear from the legislative history that Congress
intended to cover all reckless and negligent behavior.68 On the one
hand, Congress was concerned about the government insider who
might sell secrets to make money but claim indifference to how the
information will be used.69 The “reason to believe” standard, if
interpreted objectively, successfully achieves this goal. On the other
hand, however, this statute appears to cover also just about every
act of newsgathering, including those made for or by the press. After
all, anyone who collects national security information with the aim
of disseminating it to the public has an objective “reason to believe”
a foreign enemy could get that information.70 It does not appear that
Congress meant to treat these two categories of potential defendants
the same.71
Another confusing aspect of these statutory provisions is the
requirement that a defendant intend or have reason to believe that
the information at issue “is to be used” to the advantage of a foreign
country or to harm the United States.72 This language suggests that
an actor must have some awareness of how the information he has
obtained will be put to use in order to be held criminally liable.
Arguably, this language suggests that the actor must intend or have
reason to believe that the primary use to which this information will
be used is a harmful one, not merely that such an outcome is
possible.
65. Id. at 997.
66. Id. at 942.
67. Id. at 989-90.
68. Id. at 997 (“Entirely absent, despite the ‘reason to believe’ language, is any indication
that Congress understood reckless or negligent behavior to be covered.”).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 998.
71. Id.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) (2012).
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Subsections 793(d) and (e) apply most directly to the communica-
tion of information to and by the press. Subsection 793(d) provides
that anyone in
lawful[ ] ... possession of ... any document, writing, code book,
signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue-
print, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating
to the national defense, or information relating to the national
defense which information the possessor has reason to believe
could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advan-
tage of any foreign nation, who willfully communicates, delivers,
[or] transmits the same to those not entitled to receive it.73
Subsection 793(e) is virtually identical to § 793(d), but it applies to
those who have “unauthorized possession” of the listed materials
and information;74 the plain language appears to permit the prose-
cution of the press or any other government outsider. Both § 793(d)
and (e) apply whenever a defendant discloses national security
materials or information to “any person not entitled to receive it.”75
The category of recipients is not defined in the statute, but the
statute arguably includes members of the news media and applies
whenever unauthorized disclosures are made (and even repeated)
downstream from the original source.76 Section 793 authorizes the
imposition of fines and/or up to 10 years in prison.77
As with § 793(a) and (b), the scienter requirements of § 793(d) and
(e) are unclear. Both sections provide that the defendant must have
acted with “reason to believe [the information] could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign na-
tion.”78 Notably, these provisions do not require that a defendant act
73. Id. § 793(d).
74. Id. § 793(e)
75. Id. § 793(d)-(e).
76. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1063 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
defendant’s argument that § 793 applies only in cases involving traditional espionage and
explaining that the statute contains no such limitation and no press exemption); see also
Espionage Act Hearing, supra note 8, at 67 (statement of Stephen I. Vladeck, Professor of
Law, American University) (“[T]he text of the Act draws no distinction between the leaker,
the recipient of the leak, or the 100th person to redistribute, retransmit, or even retain the
national defense information that, by that point, is already in the public domain.”). 
77. 18 U.S.C. § 793(f).
78. Id. § 793(d)-(e).
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with the intent to harm the United States or to advantage a foreign
nation. Instead, these subsections provide that it is sufficient for a
defendant to have reason to believe that the information “could be
used” for harmful purposes. In other words, in contrast to the
culpability provisions in § 793(a) and (b), which require intent or
reason to believe the information “is to be used” for bad purposes, §
793(d) and (e) apparently require the government to demonstrate
merely that the actor was aware—or should have been aware—of
the possibility that the audience could use the information for
nefarious ends.
Whatever this culpability standard means, courts have generally
agreed that it modifies only the phrase immediately preceding it:
“information relating to the national defense.”79 Some courts have
explained that the distinction between tangible and intangible
information makes sense because “a defendant will more readily
recognize a document relating to the national defense based on its
content, markings or design than it would intangible or oral
‘information’ that may not share such attributes.”80 As a result, in
cases involving the communication of the specific tangible items
listed in the statute (documents, photographs, etc.), the government
does not have to demonstrate that the defendant had any mens rea
regarding the harmfulness of those items.81 This explanation is
problematic on a number of levels, not the least of which is that the
line between “documents” and “information” is hardly a clear one.82
In cases involving the transmission of documents, the only mens
rea requirement the government must demonstrate is that the
defendant communicated, delivered, or transmitted the items
“willfully.”83 The Supreme Court has had several opportunities to
interpret “willfully” in other federal statutes and has noted that the
word can have “many meanings.”84 At a minimum, the Court has
79. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d 909, 917 (D. Md. 2011).
80. Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 917.
81. Id. (stating that when a defendant is charged with possessing documents, the
government need only prove that the defendant acted willfully).
82. See Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 1048-49 (exploring the fuzzy distinction
between the two categories). For example, it is unclear whether a government employee’s
notes summarizing national security information would be a “document” or “information.” Id.
83. Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 917.
84. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998); see also Edgar & Schmidt, Jr.,
supra note 2, at 1038 (“ ‘Willful’ is one of the law’s chameleons, taking on different meanings
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held that the term “differentiates between deliberate and unwitting
conduct, but in the criminal law, it also typically refers to a culpable
state of mind.”85 Unhelpfully, the Court has said that “willfully”
means that a defendant acted with “a bad purpose,”86 and that “[t]he
jury must find that the defendant acted with an evil-meaning mind,
that is to say, that he acted with knowledge that his conduct was
unlawful.”87 In the same breath, the Court has explained that “bad
purpose” simply means that the defendant acted with knowledge
that he was breaking the law.88 Knowledge that one’s conduct is
unlawful, however, is not the same as having a bad motive. To make
matters even more confusing, the Court has interpreted “willfully”
more vigorously in cases in which the defendant has “engaged in
apparently innocent conduct.”89 Determining what conduct is
“apparently innocent” is hardly a straightforward inquiry.
Unfortunately, § 793 and its legislative history contain no clear
indication of which meaning of “willfully” Congress intended. Edgar
and Schmidt argue that their review of the legislative history indi-
cates that Congress did not intend “willfully” to mean the same
thing as the “intent or reason to believe” standard it frequently
used, or any other “narrow conception of ‘willfully’ that looks to
motivation.”90 Courts interpreting this mens rea requirement in the
context of § 793 have held that the government does not have to
demonstrate that the defendant acted with intent to harm the
United States or give advantage to a foreign interest.91
in different contexts.”).
85. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191.
86. Id. at 191-92 (“As a general matter, when used in the criminal context, a ‘willful’ act
is one undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’ In other words, in order to establish a ‘willful’
violation of a statute, ‘the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge
that his conduct was unlawful.’” (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994))). 
87. Id. at 193.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 194-95.
90. See Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 1040, 1042. 
91. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1277-78 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the government does not have to demonstrate that the defendant knew he was breaking the
law but instead simply that he “voluntarily and intentionally committed the acts charged”);
United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1073 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that “proof of the most
laudable motives, or any motive at all, is irrelevant under the statute” (internal quotations
omitted)); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 919 (4th Cir. 1980) (upholding
verdict when the jury was instructed that a defendant must act “voluntarily and intentionally
and with a specific intent to do something the law forbids”); United States v. Drake, 818 F.
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Although the plain language of the statute easily includes the
information-sharing activities of the press (the press certainly
“communicates”),92 some have argued that the absence of the word
“publish” in § 793 indicates that Congress intended to exclude the
press.93 Given the complicated history of the Espionage Act and
related statutes, it is doubtful that Congress’s word choice is
meaningful as a matter of statutory interpretation.94 The relevant
legislative history of these statutes indicates Congress did not
intend for these laws to be used against the press, even if the disclo-
sures caused harm to national security interests and the press was
well aware of those risks when publishing.95 The plain language of
the relevant statutes, however, does not protect the press or its
sources.96 Courts have not had an opportunity to weigh in on this
issue because the government has never brought a prosecution
against a news organization for publishing national security infor-
mation.97
Supp. 2d 909, 918 (D. Md. 2011) (rejecting the argument that the “willfully” requirement
means the government has to show that the defendant acted with a bad motive); United
States v. Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d 44, 53-54 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that the government must
prove only that defendant knew what he was doing was unlawful).
92. Papandrea, supra note 11, at 279 (arguing that in N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam), the concurring opinions of Justices Stewart, White, and
Blackmun, combined with the three dissenting Justices, indicate the government would be
entitled to a lesser standard if it pursued criminal charges against the newspapers).
93. See Vladeck, supra note 42, at 124 (making this observation); see, e.g., United States
v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 328-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971)
(en banc), rev’d, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
94. Bellia, supra note 8, at 1488-91. In addition, it is not clear whether excluding
publications would make any sense, given that the disclosure of information to broad
audiences arguably causes more damage. Id. at 1491. 
95. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 46, at 393 n.159.
96. Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Publication of National Security Information in the Digital
Age, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 119, 124-26 (2011).
97. In United States v. Rosen, the government brought charges under § 793 against two
members of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) who had received
information from a government employee. The Department of Justice has also allegedly
convened a grand jury to prosecute charges against WikiLeak’s publisher Julian Assange, who
is arguably not distinguishable in any legally relevant way from traditional news
organizations. See Papandrea, supra note 96, at 124-26; Assange Attorney: Secret Grand Jury
Meeting in Virginia on WikiLeaks, CNN (Dec. 13, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/
CRIME/12/13/wikileaks.investigation [http://perma.cc/ 6S7S-FE7M]. Whatever reasons the
government has for not prosecuting traditional news organizations for violating § 793(e), it
is highly unlikely that the absence of the word “publish” in the statute is one of them.
1402 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1381
b. Section 794
Section 794 of the Espionage Act, titled “Gathering or delivering
defense information to aid foreign governments,” is the section of
the Act most directly and obviously aimed at traditional espionage
activities.98 Section 794(a) imposes criminal penalties on anyone
who “communicates, delivers, or transmits” national security infor-
mation99 to any foreign government—friend or foe100—or “to any
faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country,”
provided that the person has the “intent or reason to believe that
[the information] is to be used to the injury of the United States or
aid a foreign nation.”101 Unlike § 793(d) and (e), the mens rea
requirements appears at the outset of the subsection and applies in
every case, not just those involving intangible disclosures of infor-
mation.102 Finally, the punishments § 794(a) authorizes are much
more severe than those in § 793. A defendant convicted under
§ 794(a) faces up to life in prison or the death penalty in cases
involving particularly dangerous categories of information.”103 The
penalties this section authorize reveal the more serious nature of
the actions prohibited.104
As with § 793, § 794(a)’s failure to use the word “publish”— de-
spite its appearance in other provisions of the Espionage Act—might
indicate that the subsection does not apply to the press.105 It is not
a stretch, however, to say that the press “communicates” when it
publishes.106 Furthermore, § 794(a) arguably contemplates the use
of the press to communicate with foreign powers because it provides
that the prohibited communication or transmission of the informa-
98. 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
99. The statute specifically lists the prohibited items: “document, writing, code book,
signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note,
instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national defense.” Id. § 794(a).
100. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 29-30 (1941) (interpreting the prior statute and
concluding that “[n]o distinction is made between friend or enemy”).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1065 (4th Cir. 1988).
105. See Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 943-44 (arguing that the drafters
specifically avoided using the word “publish” in this provision, even though they used that
word in § 794(b)). 
106. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
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tion can be made “either directly or indirectly.”107 As the government
argued in its prosecution of Chelsea (Bradley) Manning, someone
wishing to communicate with a foreign government could use the
press (or other downstream publisher) as an intermediary to com-
municate the information indirectly to a foreign power.108
Section 794(b), which is applicable only “in time of war,” covers
communications to “the enemy” of specific military information as
well as “any ... information relating to the public defense, which
might be useful to the enemy.”109 Unlike § 794(a), § 794(b) does not
require that an offender have “intent or reason to believe” that the
disclosed national defense information will be “used to the injury of
the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation.”110 The
only relevant intent is the defendant’s intent to communicate with
the enemy. There is no scienter requirement regarding the harm the
disclosure might cause, and there is no requirement that the mater-
ials cause national security harm. Instead, the only mention of harm
comes in the last catchall phrase indicating that the statute applies
to “any other information relating to the public defense, which
107. Id.
108. Charlie Savage, Manning Found Not Guilty of Aiding the Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
2013, at A1. But cf. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 943 (arguing that the “direct or
indirect” language is “better read as directed at communication between citizens when the
transmitter realizes that his contact is but a link in an intended chain to a foreign recipient”).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2012) (emphasis added). The full text of § 794(b) provides as
follows: 
Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to
the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or communicates, or attempts to elicit
any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition,
or disposition of any of the Armed Forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the
United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or
conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or
measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or
defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense,
which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by
imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
Id. Note that § 794(b) focuses specifically on communications to “the enemy,” rather than
§ 794(a)’s broader prohibition on communications to any foreign government. The statute does
not define enemy or indicate whether there must be a declared war for the statute to apply.
See Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 945 (exploring this ambiguity).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 794(a)-(b).
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might be useful to the enemy.”111 The penalty provision of § 794(b)
carries up to life in prison or the death penalty.112
Unlike § 794(a), § 794(b) specifically covers anyone who “pub-
lishes” military information,113 and the use of this word indicates
Congress meant for the law to apply to the press.114 Although there
are no cases interpreting this statute, prosecuting most news
organizations would be almost impossible in most circumstances
given the difficulties of proving purposeful intent to communicate
with the enemy, rather than mere awareness that the enemy might
read the publication.115 However, Congress has been aware for over
a century that it is possible for a news organization to have the
specific intent to aid the enemy.116 Indeed, the Trading with the
Enemy Act of 1917, which was passed contemporaneously with the
Espionage Act, required foreign language newspapers to submit
translations before publication, demonstrating Congress’s concern
with treasonous newspapers.117 Although society often believes that
the Internet has given rise to problems never before contemplated,
concern about news organizations acting in bad faith is not new.
2. Using Culpability Requirements to Limit the Scope of
“Information Relating to National Defense”
Both § 793 and § 794 contain a catch-all provision extending their
coverage to “information relating to the national defense.”118 The
Espionage Act does not contain a definition of what falls within this
category, but on its face, the scope is expansive. The Supreme Court
has relied on the culpability requirements in these statutes to
restrict the scope of that phrase, and in so doing, reject defense
arguments that it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.119 The
Court’s decision, however, has added another layer of confusion to
an already confusing set of statutes.
111. Id. § 794(b).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 1034-35.
115. Id. at 965.
116. See id. at 965-66.
117. Id.
118. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-794.
119. See Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
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In Gorin v. United States, the Court held that the term “national
defense” contained in a predecessor provision was a “generic concept
of broad connotations, referring to the military and naval establish-
ments and the related activities of national preparedness.”120 To
prosecute under this clause, the Court held that the government
does not have to provide any proof of injury or even potential injury
to the United States; it is sufficient that the information could be
advantageous to a foreign country.121 The Court rejected arguments
that the language “information relating to national security” was
unconstitutionally vague on the ground that the phrase was limited
by a scienter requirement that the offender had “reason to believe
that the information ... is to be used to the injury of the United
States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.”122
It is puzzling why the Court thought the mens rea requirement
was the best way to place a meaningful limit on an otherwise vague
and potentially all-encompassing phrase.123 Certainly Congress had
other options. For example, it could have listed certain categories of
information, similar to what it has done in § 798 (communications
intelligence information),124 the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (nuclear
energy and weapons information),125 or the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act of 1982 (information revealing identities of covert
agents).126
Furthermore, Gorin’s explanation of the precise nature of this
intent requirement was unclear. The Court stated:
120. Id. at 27-28. Although this definition of national defense information is potentially
limited to military information and tactical plans, lower courts have rejected such a limited
construction. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 918 (4th Cir. 1980)
(rejecting the defendants’ attempt to limit “national defense” information to information
concerning military matters); United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246, 1251-52 (9th Cir. 1979).
121. Gorin, 312 U.S. at 29-30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. Id. at 27-28. This scienter requirement applies only to the disclosure of “information
relating to the national defense” and not to any of the other tangible materials listed in the
statute. See S. REP. NO. 81-2369, at 9 (1950). This premise is clear not only from the plain
language of the statute but also from the legislative history. The report from the Senate
Judiciary Committee, which added the scienter language to the statute, specifically stated
that the phrase “which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation” modified only
“information relating to the national defense.” Id.
123. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 1076-77.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2012).
125. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297h (2012).
126. 50 U.S.C. § 3121 (2012).
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The obvious delimiting words in the statute are those requiring
“intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained
is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advan-
tage of any foreign nation.” This requires those prosecuted to
have acted in bad faith. The sanctions apply only when scienter
is established. Where there is no occasion for secrecy, as with
reports relating to national defense, published by authority of
Congress or the military departments, there can, of course, in all
likelihood be no reasonable intent to give an advantage to a
foreign government.127
It is not clear whether Gorin establishes an objective or subjective
culpability standard.
In particular, the Court used the phrase “bad faith” in a confusing
manner. To some, bad faith suggests a subjective intent to harm the
United States or to give an advantage to a foreign power. Indeed,
some lower courts have embraced this reading of the same “intent
or reason to believe” scienter requirement. For example, in United
States v. Rosen, Judge Ellis held that the government would have to
prove not only that the defendants knew that the national defense
information at issue could harm the United States, but also that
they had a “bad faith purpose to either harm the United States or
to aid a foreign government.”128 In other words, Judge Ellis ex-
plained, even if the defendants knew the disclosure of the informa-
tion could harm the United States or help its enemies, they could
not be convicted under the statute if they disclosed the information
for “some salutary motive” or “as an act of patriotism.”129 Instead,
Judge Ellis held, the disclosure of the information must be objec-
tively harmful to the United States, and the defendant must be
subjectively intending to cause that harm.130 In fact, the court spe-
cifically distinguished between unauthorized communications of
national security documents, which did not contain the “intent or
127. Gorin, 312 U.S. at 27-28.
128. United States v. Rosen (Rosen I), 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 626 (E.D. Va. 2006); see also
United States v. Troung Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 919 (4th Cir. 1980) (approving a jury
instruction that “defined bad faith as a ‘design to mislead or deceive another ... [meaning] not
prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s duties, but prompted by some personal or under-
handed motive’”).
129. Rosen I, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
130. Id. at 640-41, 641 nn.55-56.
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reason to know” limitation, and the unauthorized communication of
national security information, which did contain that limitation.131
The government could prosecute the former, Judge Ellis explained,
even if the defendants acted with “some salutary motive.”132
Some courts have expressed doubts about Judge Ellis’s reading of
the “intent or reason to believe” language.133 The most fundamental
objection is that a “bad faith” requirement does not appear in the
plain language of the statute. As one district court held, “the text of
the statute means what it says ... ‘the possessor ha[d] reason to
believe [that the information] could be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.’ ”134 Fur-
thermore, some courts have questioned whether an additional mens
rea requirement is necessary in cases involving past or present
intelligence officers who “had a recognized obligation not to divulge
classified, national defense information to those not entitled to
receive it.”135 In such cases, the courts have explained, an additional
mens rea requirement should not be necessary to satisfy the due
131. Id.
132. Id. at 625; see also United States v. Rosen (Rosen II), 520 F. Supp. 2d 786, 793 (E.D.
Va. 2007) (“These are glosses on the statutory willfulness requirement that also require the
government to prove, in cases involving oral disclosures rather than document disclosures,
that the defendant had a bad faith purpose to harm the United States or to aid a foreign
government.”); United States v. Smith, 592 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 (E.D. Va. 1984) (citing
Gorin’s “bad faith” language and concluding that “the government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused had the requisite intent to injure this country or aid a
foreign government”).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Rosen (Rosen III), 557 F.3d 192, 199 n.8 (4th Cir. 2009)
(stating in dicta that although it lacked jurisdiction to review Judge Ellis’s interpretation of
that clause, “[w]e are nevertheless concerned by the potential that the [district court order]
imposes an additional burden on the prosecution not mandated by the governing statute”);
United States v. Miller, 874 F. 2d 1255, 1277-78 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding “bad faith” language
in Gorin simply requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant “voluntarily and
intentionally committed the acts charged”); Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 918 (rejecting
defendants’ arguments that § 793(e) required the government to demonstrate that they acted
with “evil intent, i.e., intent to injure the United States or to aid a foreign nation”); United
States v. Kiriakou, 898 F. Supp. 2d 921, 924-27 (E.D. Va. 2012). In the few cases involving
prosecutions under the information clause of § 793(d), the government has not been required
to prove that the disclosures were made in bad faith. See, e.g., Kiriakou, 898 F. Supp. 2d at
925-26 (citing United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 135 (2d Cir. 2010); United States
v. Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d 44, 55 (D.D.C. 2011)); see also id. at 926 (discussing military court
decisions rejecting arguments that the government must demonstrate that the defendant
acted out of bad motive).
134. Kiriakou, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 926 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 793(d)).
135. Id. at 925 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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process concerns136 that were arguably present in Rosen, which
involved the prosecution of two government outsiders. This support
draws support from legislative history, which indicates that the
drafters did not believe an additional mens rea requirement was
necessary because it applied to “persons presumably in closer rela-
tionship to the Government which they seek to betray.”137
Another potential reading of Gorin is that the primary purpose of
the scienter requirement is to make sure that innocent acts are not
punished. In other words, even if the act objectively causes harm to
national security, it is essential to determine whether the defendant
himself knew of that potential harm.138 As one court concluded when
faced with a similar intent provision in a federal sabotage statute,
the only intent required is the intent to interfere with a facility
essential for national preparedness.139 The defendant’s patriotism,
religious motivation, or other benign purpose for committing those
acts is irrelevant.140
A close reading of Gorin suggests that the Court did not mean to
embrace a subjective standard. After stating that a defendant has
to act “in bad faith,” the Court went on to discuss how “information
relating to the national defense” has “a well understood connota-
tion.”141 The Court concluded that the information the defendants
communicated was the sort of information that would be objectively
useful for a foreign country.142 The Court also favorably cited one of
its prior decisions holding that the jury decides “[w]hat interpreta-
tion ought to be placed upon the pamphlet, what would be the
136. Id. at 924.
137. Id. at 925 (quoting United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1073 n.26 (4th Cir.
1998)).
138. Cf. United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580, 587 (8th Cir. 1986) (relying on Gorin to
interpret similar language in the Sabotage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2155). The court in Kabat stated,
“The scienter requirement of section 2155 protects those who do not recognize the military
uses of property against which they do violence.” Id. Another case interpreted the Sabotage
Act and explained that “[t]he inclusion of a scienter requirement decreases the likelihood that
a person of common intelligence would not understand what conduct the statute prohibits and
reduces the chance that the statute will reach innocent conduct.” United States v. Walli, No.
3:12-CR-107, 2013 WL 1773617, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2013).
139. Kabat, 797 F.2d at 587.
140. Id.
141. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941). 
142. Id. at 29 (explaining various ways in which a foreign entity might use the information
the defendants provided).
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probable effect of distributing it in the mode adopted, and what
were defendants’ motives in doing this.”143 In that previous decision,
however, the Court held the defendants’ knowledge of the contents
of the pamphlet “of itself furnished a ground for attributing to them
an intent to bring about, and for finding that they attempted to
bring about, any and all such consequences as reasonably might be
anticipated from its distribution.”144 Indeed, Justices Holmes and
Brandeis dissented in that case, arguing that, among other things,
there was not “a particle of evidence that these statements were
made with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the
military and naval forces,” and that “[s]o far as there is any evidence
bearing on the matter of intent, it is directly to the contrary.”145
They pointed out that the only evidence of intent was the leaflet it-
self.146 Given that Gorin was decided in 1941, when the Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence was still in infancy, it is not surprising
that the majority of Justices appeared to embrace a standard
consistent with the Court’s Espionage Act decisions from the same
time period.
Another puzzling aspect of Gorin is its assertion that “[w]here
there is no occasion for secrecy, as with reports relating to national
defense, published by authority of Congress or the military depart-
ments, there can, of course, in all likelihood be no reasonable intent
to give an advantage to a foreign government.”147 It is unclear
whether publicly available information can ever constitute national
defense information covered under the Espionage Act, or whether
the fact that information is publicly available is simply a factor to
be taken into account when determining if the defendant had the
requisite intent to aid a foreign government. The fairest reading of
the quoted language from Gorin is the latter, but it is hardly clear
this makes any sense. If the disclosure of the information at issue
does not pose any risk of injury to the United States or give an
advantage to a foreign nation, the defendant’s intent does not seem
relevant. In addition, the defendant’s intent does not seem obviously
143. Id. at 32 (quoting Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 250 (1920)).
144. Pierce, 252 U.S. at 249.
145. Id. at 271 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
146. Id. at 272 (“No evidence of intent ... was introduced unless it be found in the leaflet
itself.”).
147. Gorin, 312 U.S. at 28.
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connected to the secrecy, or lack thereof, of the national security
information.148
Whether the required intent is the subjective intent to harm the
United States or constructive harm based on the reasonable conse-
quences of their speech, what harm is sufficient to constitute “injury
to the United States” remains unclear.149 The government has
argued that any breaches of confidentiality harm the United States
because the breaches send a message to our friends and allies alike
that we cannot be trusted. The Court has sometimes accepted the
legitimacy of this argument, particularly in the context of govern-
ment insiders.150 And to a certain extent, the extensive document
dumps by leakers like Chelsea (Bradley) Manning might harm our
national security interests because they can have a chilling effect on
the free flow of information and communications among U.S. gov-
ernment officials who “can no longer assume that their off-record,
secretive communications among themselves can remain confi-
dential.”151 Another problem with proving harm is that it is
impossible to know whether our friends or enemies already have
access to the revealed information.152
But it may not even matter whether the disclosed information
could harm the United States, as long as it might advantage a
foreign power. The statute does not define “advantage.” Any piece
of information relating to the national defense could help its recip-
ient in some way. As a result, the alternative grounds for criminal
liability—that the information “harms” the United States—is
arguably “surplusage because it is improbable for the United States
to be injured except by conduct which also advantages some foreign
nation.”153
148. See Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 980.
149. See United States v. Hitselberger, 991 F. Supp. 2d 101, 105 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding
that defendant had no standing to make this argument because he was charged under only
the “document clause” of § 793(e), which does not contain the additional mens rea
requirement).
150. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510-11 (1980).
151. Mark Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REV. 753,
777 (2012).
152. See Posner, supra note 8, at n.2 (“It turns out to be exceptionally difficult to prove that
disclosures cause harm because one can rarely rule out the possibility that the enemy already
has the information.”).
153. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 988.
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It is important to keep in mind that when Gorin was decided in
1941, the classification system for sensitive information did not
exist. Later courts have noted that classification of information is
probative, although not conclusive, evidence that the information
relates to the national defense.154 To be constitutional, lower courts
have first required that the information at issue not be publicly
available,155 and the information, if disclosed, must be “potentially
damaging to the United States or might be useful to an enemy of the
United States.”156 Furthermore, lower courts have narrowly
interpreted the Gorin exception for national security information
that is not secret. For example, the Fourth Circuit has held that the
fact that some of the information at issue is publicly available is
irrelevant if that information was not made publicly available by the
government in an official document.157
C. Other Relevant Statutes
Issues of intent have arisen in debates surrounding other laws
aimed at punishing the unauthorized disclosure of national security
information.
1. Specific Categories of Information
In the decades following the Espionage Act, Congress passed ad-
ditional legislation targeting the unauthorized disclosures of specific
154. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting defendant’s
challenge to “potentially damaging” jury charge based on circuit precedent); Rosen I, 445 F.
Supp. 2d 602, 623-24 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
155. See, e.g., Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941) (explaining that if the
information is not in fact secret, “there can, of course, in all likelihood be no reasonable intent
to give an advantage to a foreign government”); United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 816 (2d
Cir. 1945) (holding that compiling and disseminating publicly available information to
Germany concerning the production of airplanes in the United States did not constitute a
violation of the Espionage Act because none of the transmitted information was secret). 
156. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071; see also Rosen I, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 621-22.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 577-80 (4th Cir. 2000); see also
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972) (“Rumor and speculation are
not the equivalent of prior disclosure, however, and the presence of that kind of surmise
should be no reason for avoidance of restraints upon confirmation from one in a position to
know officially.”).
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categories of national security information with limited intent
standards—in some cases, virtually none at all.
For example, § 798 specifically criminalizes “knowingly and
willfully” communicating, transmitting, furnishing, or publishing
“classified information ... concerning the communication intelligence
activities of the United States.”158 Although this statute is broadly
applicable to government insiders and outsiders alike, the statute
does not require an offender to have “intent or reason to believe”
that the publication would harm the United States or provide an
advantage to a foreign power. The legislative history demonstrates
that the government does not have to prove that the defendant
acted with a motive to harm the United States or aid a foreign
entity.159
Another example is the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which
protects the secrecy of information relating to nuclear energy and
weapons.160 The Act subjects anyone who “communicates, transmits,
or discloses” documents or information “involving or incorporating
Restricted Data” with the “intent to injure the United States” or ad-
vantage a foreign nation,161 or who has “reason to believe such data”
would have that effect to criminal penalties.162 Those who act with
“intent” to advantage a foreign nation or harm the United States
face possible life imprisonment and a $100,000 fine, whereas those
who act with mere “reason to believe” that the information could ad-
vantage a foreign nation face a maximum of ten years in jail and a
$50,000 fine.163 These provisions apply regardless of whether the
offender obtained the documents or information at issue “lawfully
or unlawfully.”164 Those who receive, attempt to receive, or conspire
to receive documents or information “involving or incorporating
Restricted Data” can also be prosecuted under another provision
provided they act “with intent to injure the United States or with in-
tent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation.”165
158. 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2012).
159. See Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 1065.
160. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2274(a) (2012).
161. Id. § 2274.
162. Id. § 2274(b).
163. Id. § 2274(a)-(b).
164. Id. § 2274.
165. Id. § 2275.
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In addition, government employees, contractors, and military
officials can be punished for “knowingly” communicating “Restricted
Data” to any person not authorized to receive it as long as the
offender did so “knowing or having reason to believe that such data
is Restricted Data.”166 In such a case, it is not necessary that a
person communicate Restricted Data with the intent to harm the
United States or advantage a foreign nation, or with reason to
believe the communication would have such effect. The Act also
specifically authorizes the government to obtain injunctive relief to
prevent any violations of its provisions.167 In United States v.
Progressive, Inc., a federal district court relied on the Atomic Energy
Act to grant a preliminary injunction to prevent the publication of
a magazine article describing a method of manufacturing and
assembling a hydrogen bomb.168
A third example of legislation aimed at a specific category of
national security information is the Intelligence Identities Protec-
tion Act of 1982 (IIPA), which prohibits the identification of covert
agents.169 The debate surrounding the enactment of this legislation
focused extensively on the appropriate culpability standards as a
possible means for protecting well-meaning publications. Under the
first two provisions of the IIPA, which are directed at past or
present government employees, contractors, or military officials,
anyone with authorized access to classified information that ident-
ifies a covert agent is prohibited from “intentionally disclosing” that
information to any individual not entitled to receive it.170 The
statute does not require the defendant to have any particular motive
for the disclosure.171
166. Id. § 2277.
167. Id. § 2280.
168. 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. Wis. 1979). Unlike the Espionage Act, the Atomic Energy
Act specifically authorizes the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief against someone who
“has engaged or is about to engage” in any violation of its provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2280. In
Progressive, Inc., the district court held that it would have granted prior restraint even in the
absence of an authorizing statute because of the likelihood of “grave, direct, immediate and
irreparable harm to the United States.” Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 996.
169. 50 U.S.C. § 3121 (2012).
170. Id. § 3121(a)-(b).
171. Id. The only qualifications on criminal liability are that the discloser of information
has knowledge that the information identifies the agent and that the United States is taking
affirmative steps to conceal the identity of that agent. Id.
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The third provision of the IIPA prohibits anyone outside the
government from disclosing information identifying a covert agent
to anyone not entitled to receive classified information.172 This
portion of the statute is not limited to the disclosure of classified
information. As the committee report explained, a person could be
prosecuted under this statute for publishing information obtained
through a “comprehensive counterintelligence effort of engaging in
physical surveillance, electronic surveillance abroad, and other
techniques of espionage directed at covert agents.”173
The legislative history reflects concern about criminalizing
constitutionally protected speech, such as academic studies or
reports in the media of intelligence failures.174 Earlier proposed
versions required the government to prove that the disclosure of the
identity of a covert agent was made “with the intent to impair or
impede foreign intelligence activities.”175 Some critics complained
that this sort of subjective intent standard would not protect
journalists because the fact-finder might accept a history of
reporting critical of the United States as evidence of a bad intent.176
At the same time, the government was concerned that an intent
standard could make it unduly difficult to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that a defendant intended to impede foreign intelligence
activities and could lead to graymail.177
172. Id. § 3121(c) (“Whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities intended to identify and
expose covert agents and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede
the foreign intelligence activities of the United States, discloses any information that
identifies an individual as a covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified
information ... shall be fined ... or imprisoned.”).
173. Jerry J. Berman & Morton H. Halperin, The Agents Identities Protection Act: A
Preliminary Analysis of the Legislative History, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NATIONAL
SECURITY 41, 51-52 (1984).
174. Id. at 41-55.
175. Proposals to Criminalize the Unauthorized Disclosure of the Identities of Undercover
United States Intelligence Officers and Agents: Hearing on H.R. 5615 Before the Subcomm. on
Legis. of the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong. 156, 158 (1980); see H.R.
REP. NO. 96-1219, pt. 1, at 2, 6-7 (1980).
176. Intelligence Identities Protection Legislation: Hearings on S. 2216 Before the S. Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong. 22 (1980) [hereinafter S. 2216 Intelligence Hearings]
(testimony of Robert L. Keuch, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States); cf. id. at
154-155 (written statement of Ford Rowan, Att’y, Former NBC Correspondent) (noting that
sometimes the media wants to “impair and impede” an intelligence activity that undermines
the moral stature of the United States).
177. See Berman & Halperin, supra note 173, at 43. Prosecutors who are “graymailed” may
instead choose not to pursue a case. Floyd Abrams, a prominent First Amendment lawyer,
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Congress abandoned the bad intent standard in favor of a more
objective “reason to believe standard” and coupled it with a require-
ment that the exposure be part of a “pattern of activities intended
to identify and expose covert agents.”178 By changing the statute to
require a “pattern of activities,” Congress attempted to limit the
applicability of the statute to those who “make it their business to
ferret out and publish the identities of agents,” without “affect[ing]
the First Amendment rights of those who disclose the identities of
agents as an integral part of another enterprise such as news media
reporting of intelligence failures or abuses, academic studies of U.S.
government policies and programs, or a private organization’s
enforcement of its internal rules.”179 The committee report also
indicated that a reporter would “rarely” have the requisite intent to
“identify and expose covert agents,” as the law requires.180 Any proof
that a reporter had that intent could be rebutted by evidence
demonstrating an alternative, permissible intent, such as the intent
to explain questionable government conduct.181
2. Espionage-Related Statutes
In addition to the Espionage Act, Congress has passed a number
of other laws that target conduct closely related to traditional espio-
nage activities.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 951, it is federal crime to serve “in the United
States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notifica-
tion to the Attorney General.”182 The statute defines “agent of a
foreign government” as “an individual who agrees to operate within
the United States subject to the direction or control of a foreign
conceded that graymail was a possibility, but argued, “I think we are willing as a general
matter to live with the proposition that guilty people might even get off because we think we
are preserving some other very important rights.” S. 2216 Intelligence Hearings, supra note
176, at 82 (testimony of Floyd Abrams).
178. 50 U.S.C. § 3121(c) (2012).
179. Berman & Halperin, supra note 173, at 50-51.
180. Id. at 52.
181. Id. at 53.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 951(a) (2012). The law excludes diplomatic or consular officers of foreign
governments recognized by the Department of State, “any officially and publicly acknowledged
and sponsored official or representative of a foreign government,” and “any person engaged
in a legal commercial transaction.” See id. § 951(d).
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government or official.”183 In United States v. Dumeisi, a defendant
was convicted of violating this provision based on evidence that he
published newspaper articles in an Arabic-language newspaper in
the Chicago suburbs pursuant to the directions and instructions of
the Iraqi Intelligence Service.184 The Seventh Circuit held that the
conviction did not violate the First Amendment because the district
court properly instructed the jury that the defendant could be con-
victed only if he published these articles pursuant to the direction
or control of a foreign government, not simply because he published
newspaper articles, which is a constitutionally protected activity.185
Federal law also specifically prohibits government employees
from communicating classified information “in any manner or by
any means, to any other person whom such officer or employee
knows or has reason to believe to be an agent or representative of
any foreign government.”186 Although the plain language of this
statute might support the prosecution of a government insider who
gives information to the press in the hopes that it would be dissemi-
nated to a foreign government or agent, Edgar and Schmidt con-
clude that the legislative history indicates the contrary.187 This
statute applies only if the defendant “know[s] or ha[s] reason to
know” that the information was classified.188 Lower courts, however,
have held that the government does not have to prove that the
information was properly classified.189 The D.C. Circuit explained
that employees can go through the appropriate internal channels to
challenge a classification decision, but they cannot challenge the
183. Id. § 951(d).
184. 424 F.3d 566, 569-71 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming conviction). The Fourth Circuit also
affirmed a conviction under this provision in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d
908, 919-20 (4th Cir. 1980).
185. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d at 570 (holding jury instructions made clear that defendant's
writings, “as well as [his] opinion and political views, are to be considered only insofar as they
may pertain to issues of motive and intent”).
186. 50 U.S.C. § 783 (2012).
187. Edgar & Schmidt Jr., supra note 2, at 1074 (“The legislative history nowhere suggests
that such communication would be deemed to have taken place through disclosure of
classified information to the press, followed by widespread publication.”).
188. 50 U.S.C. § 783(a).
189. See, e.g., Scarbeck v. United States, 317 F.2d 546, 558-60 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (“[W]e think
that the inclusion of the requirement for scienter on the part of the employee is a clear
indication of the congressional intent to make the superior’s classification binding on the
employee, once he knows of it.”).
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classification decision as part of their prosecution.190 Under a con-
trary rule, the D.C. Circuit asserted, “[t]he trial of the employee
would be converted into a trial of the superior.”191
D. Lessons from Congress and the Courts
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, Congress has struggled
for over one hundred years to strike the right balance between na-
tional security and free speech. The current statutory framework
and accompanying legislative history provide valuable lessons
regarding the various factors that might be relevant if and when
Congress decides to pass revised legislation relating to the collection
and dissemination of national security information. The most
important lesson is that striking the proper balance between the
free flow of information and the need to protect our national security
interests is extraordinarily difficult. But beyond that, Congress—as
well as courts tasked with interpreting and applying the current
laws—has recognized the various different facets of the problem
presented.
First, Congress clearly recognizes that traditional espionage poses
the greatest danger to our national security. Sections 793(a) and
793(b) are aimed at criminalizing the collection of national security
information knowing it would be used to harm the United States or
benefit a foreign country.192 Separate federal laws specifically make
it a crime to serve as an agent of a foreign government193 or to
communicate any classified information to any agent of a foreign
government, without a showing that the disclosure of the informa-
tion would cause any sort of harm to the United States or be benefi-
cial to a foreign entity.194
Second, the judicial debate about how to interpret Gorin reveals
concerns about treating government insiders and outsiders in the
same way.195 As some lower courts have recently explained, it might
make sense to require prosecutors to demonstrate that government
190. Id. at 559-60.
191. Id. at 560.
192. See supra Part I.B.1.
193. 18 U.S.C. § 951(a) (2012). 
194. 50 U.S.C. § 783(a) (2012).
195. See supra Part I.B.2.
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outsiders are acting with a bad purpose when they disseminate
national security information because they are not in a position of
trust like government insiders, who are better positioned to know
when information concerns national security.196
Third, it is apparent that long before the Internet and the
WikiLeaks saga Congress was aware that members of the
“press”—however that category might be defined—were not entitled
to carte blanche immunity from criminal liability for collecting or
disseminating national security information. The concern with
foreign language newspapers in the early twentieth century reveals
this unease.197 At the same time, Congress primarily directed this
concern about the press at the more fringe members of the media
establishment, particularly ones that served a foreign audience and,
most importantly, did not publish with good motives.
Finally, Congress and the courts share an overwhelming sense of
respect for the classification system. Courts have historically been
unwilling to second-guess the executive branch’s classification
system in other contexts—like Freedom of Information Act chal-
lenges198—so perhaps this should not be terribly surprising. On the
other hand, the hesitancy to permit defendants to challenge the
propriety of classification decisions is disturbing given the universal
consensus that overclassification is rampant and deeply troubling.
Congress’s deference to the classification system is even more
bizarre, given that the classification system is entirely a creature of
the executive branch with no input or oversight from Congress. By
deferring so completely to the classification system, Congress fails
to assert itself as a co-equal branch of government on national
security issues.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND INTENT
In drafting the Espionage Act and related statutes, Congress
intended to use scienter requirements to limit the statutes’ impact
on public discussion of national security issues that are so essential
196. See supra Part.I.A.2.
197. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
198. For a sense of this history, see Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public’s
Right to Know and the War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 50-52 (2005).
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to a well-functioning democracy. This Part addresses whether this
focus on intent has any basis in the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has indicated in a number of its foundational
First Amendment opinions that a speaker’s intent—and even at
times the speaker’s motivation—is relevant in determining the
scope of constitutional protection, although exactly what kind of
intent matters, why it matters, and when it should matter remains
unclear. The Court has focused on different types of intent depend-
ing on the type of speech at issue. In some cases, like defamation,
privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress cases, some
statements are protected when speakers do not know that their
statements are false or when the speakers are recklessly indifferent
to truth or falsity;199 in other contexts involving the same types of
claims, speakers must be at least negligent.200 The Court has like-
wise been concerned about an actor’s mental state regarding the
content of the speech at issue in cases involving obscenity and child
pornography.201 But in other cases involving incitement and freedom
of association the Court has suggested that the relevant inquiry is
whether the speaker has the specific intent or purpose to achieve a
harmful end.202
199. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (applying an actual malice
standard to invasion of privacy claim involving matter of public concern); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (applying an actual malice standard in a criminal libel
case involving matter of public concern); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964) (applying an actual malice test in a civil libel case brought by a public official).
200. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (applying a negligence
requirement to actual damages and an actual malice test to punitive damages in cases
involving private figures and matters of public concern). 
201. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that distribution of
child pornography is unprotected if the distributor was aware of or recklessly indifferent to
the subject’s minor status); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 148-49 (1959) (holding that
distribution of obscenity is unprotected if the distributor was aware or reckless about the
factual contents of the materials).
202. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620
(2003) (upholding fraud standard requiring intent to deceive); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding advocacy of unlawful acts is unprotected when it is
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action”). As mentioned earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court will be deciding whether a
defendant must subjectively intend for his communication to be perceived as intimidating in
order for his speech to constitute a “true threat,” an unprotected category of speech. See
United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
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A. The Court’s National Security Cases
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the scope of
First Amendment protection for the criminal punishment of unauth-
orized disclosure or dissemination of national security information,
or whether intent should play a role in determining any such
protection. This Part briefly summarizes the Court’s cases that pro-
vide insight on this question.
1. Government Outsiders and Intent
The seminal case on the scope of constitutional protection for
disclosures of national security information is New York Times Co.
v. United States (Pentagon Papers), which rejected the government’s
attempts to obtain an injunction to stop the nation’s leading news-
papers from publishing a historical study of the Vietnam War.203
Argued and decided within a matter of days, the case resulted in a
brief per curiam opinion that simply stated that the government had
not met its “heavy burden” for a prior restraint.204 Although the
Court suggested that the government could obtain an injunction to
prevent the dissemination of information that threatened an immi-
nent likelihood of grave harm to national security, the Court did not
address the difficult question of what to do when the information
posed both a grave risk of harm and high value for public debate.205
Furthermore, a close reading of the various opinions submitted in
the case suggests that a majority of the Justices would permit
subsequent criminal punishments under a much lesser standard,206
although exactly what that standard would be was left unclear.
At least one scholar has argued that the Pentagon Papers decision
indicated that the Court trusted the newspapers to balance the
203. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
204. Id. (holding that the government must bear the “heavy burden of showing justifica-
tion” when seeking to enforce a prior restraint against the publication of classified national
security information).
205. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Balancing and the Unauthorized Disclosure of National
Security Information: A Response to Mark Fenster’s Disclosure Effects: WikiLeaks and Trans-
parency, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 94, 105 (2012), http://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/files/ilr.law.uiowa.
edu/files/ILRB_97_Papandrea.pdf [http://perma.cc/EYX4-EJCL].
206. See Papandrea, supra note 11, at 279-80.
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harm and public value of the information in their hands.207 Because
courts have had very few opportunities to consider national security
cases involving the traditional media, it is impossible to draw any
broad conclusions about the judiciary’s willingness to defer to
journalistic discretion in the national security context. Nevertheless,
just two years after Pentagon Papers, the Court expressed concerns
with interfering with the press’s editorial discretion. In Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Court explained that “[i]t has
yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of th[e] crucial
process [of editorial control and judgment] can be exercised
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they
have evolved to this time,” whether “fair or unfair.”208
Indeed, in other contexts the Court has generally been very
deferential to the publication decisions made by the press and other
third parties who publish confidential information. The Supreme
Court has decided a long series of cases—often referred to as the
Daily Mail cases—involving the First Amendment rights of third
parties, like the press, to publish lawfully acquired confidential
information.209 These cases do not grant special rights to the press,
and the Court has been very careful to refrain from holding that the
First Amendment always gives third parties the right to publish
truthful information they have lawfully received, noting that the
First Amendment would tolerate punishment in cases involving
“interest[s] of the highest order.”210 Yet in ruling for third parties in
every case it has considered, the Court has relied on a number of
general assumptions, including that (1) the government bears the
burden of controlling sensitive information, and when it fails to
safeguard information, the public generally cannot be held liable for
repeating it; and (2) holding third parties liable for repeating
sensitive information they have lawfully obtained could have an
unwanted chilling effect because they cannot always know what is
sensitive and what is not.211 At the same time, in the most recent
207. See Bellia, supra note 8, at 1505 (“The Pentagon Papers case assured that, once
information of high public value was in the hands of the press, the press’s assessment would
prevail over the government’s.”).
208. 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). 
209. See Papandrea, supra note 11, at 286-96 (summarizing this series of cases).
210. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979); Papandrea, supra
note 11, at 286-87.
211. Papandrea, supra note 11, at 294-95.
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decision of this series, Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court suggested that
balancing value and harm of the information is the appropriate
approach.212 The Court held that the privacy interests in that case
“give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters
of public importance.”213
Although determining this proper balance does not necessarily
require an inquiry into the publishers’ intent, it does seem to as-
sume a certain level of good faith. None of the individual opinions
in the Pentagon Papers case discussed the newspapers’ intent, but
one of the lower court opinions did. In rejecting the government’s
request for a prior restraint, Judge Gerstein suggested that the good
faith intention to inform public debate would protect the New York
Times:
I find that there is no reasonable likelihood of the Government
successfully proving that the actions of the Times were not in
good faith, nor is there irreparable injury to the Government.
This has been an effort on the part of the Times to vindicate the
right of the public to know. It is not a case involving an intent to
communicate vital secrets for the benefit of a foreign govern-
ment or to the detriment of the United States.214
Judge Gerstein’s opinion raises the important question of who
counts as the “responsible” press, trusted to make difficult editorial
decisions about what to publish and what not to publish. Unlike
other professions, like attorneys and doctors, journalists are not li-
censed, and although various journalism associations assert certain
journalistic standards, these standards have never been judicially
enforceable. One possibility would be to use the Press Clause to give
certain publishers special protection to both obtain and publish
national security information, but the Court has never relied on the
Press Clause in any of its First Amendment decisions, and the
difficulties of defining the “press” in any satisfactory way remain
daunting, particularly with the rapid changes in the media industry
today.215
212. 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001).
213. Id. 
214. United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d, 444 F.2d
544 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), rev’d, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
215. I have explored the difficulties of defining the “press” for purposes of the reporter’s
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Given the paucity of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving the
dissemination of national security information by third parties, it is
unclear what the Court would do with such a case. That said, in
other contexts, the Court has expressed concern about interfering
with the editorial decisions of government outsiders acting with the
purpose of informing public debate.216 In addition, the Court is
concerned about establishing rules that would have a chilling effect
on the dissemination of information important for public debate.217
In order to avoid this chilling effect, the Court seems wary of any
rule that would impose liability on outsiders who lack, at a mini-
mum, knowledge regarding the sensitivity of the information at
issue.218 Bartnicki also offers supports for an approach that balances
the costs and benefits of disclosure.219 Although the Court leaves
open the possibility that some information cannot be shared when
interests “of the highest order” are involved, the burden remains on
the government to demonstrate how any such information would
cause clear harm to our national security interests.220
2. Government Insiders and Intent
Even though the Court has never directly decided a case involving
the unauthorized disclosure of information by a government insider
to the press or general public, the cases that the Court has decided
do not appear, at least at first glance, to view such disclosures favor-
ably. Upon closer inspection, however, some of the Court’s decisions
indicate that even in cases involving government insiders, the pur-
pose for the disclosure might make a constitutional difference.
The most damning opinion for government insiders is the Court’s
heavily criticized decision in Snepp v. United States.221 In this case,
the Court imposed a constructive trust on the profits a former CIA
employee received from the publication of his book, which he pub-
lished without going through the contractually required preclearance
privilege in my prior work. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s
Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 564-84 (2008). 
216. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974).
218. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
219. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001).
220. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
221. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
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procedure.222 In this opinion, the Court declared that the govern-
ment had a right to a constructive trust even though the book
admittedly did not contain any classified information.223 The Court
emphasized that the government had a compelling interest in
enforcing the preclearance process in order to protect the “appear-
ance of confidentiality.”224
Snepp did not address the obvious First Amendment concerns its
approach raised, nor did the Court even attempt to reconcile the
holding with its prior decision in Pickering v. Board of Education.225
Pickering expressly recognized the essential contributions govern-
ment employees make to public debates, noting that they are the
ones “most likely to have informed and definite opinions” on issues
relating to their employment.226 Recognizing that the government
“has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employ-
ee that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with
the regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general,”227 the Court
embraced a balancing test that weighs “the interests of the [employ-
ee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees.”228
Although a bright-line rule giving the government absolute
authority to restrict the right of its employees and contractors to
discuss national security information might pass the Pickering
balancing test, the Snepp decision lacked any such analysis of the
interests at stake. Furthermore, this balancing test is unlikely to
support such broad authority. It is not clear that the government
has a weighty interest in prohibiting insiders from discussing infor-
mation that is already in the public domain; that does not pose any
threat to national security interests; or that reveals the violation of
laws, rules, or regulations, gross mismanagement, the waste of
funds, abuses of authority, or substantial risks and dangers to pub-
lic safety.
222. See id. at 507-08, 510.
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 509 n.3. 
225. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
226. Id. at 571-72.
227. Id. at 568.
228. Id.
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It is also worth noting that Snepp and Pickering alike both arose
in the context of civil sanctions against government insiders. Al-
though the Court has made clear that the First Amendment permits
the government to exercise greater control over the speech activities
in various “managerial domains,” including when it is acting as an
employer, it is hardly clear that this leeway extends to the imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions. Although conceptualizing this difference
may be difficult, in the context of government employees and
contractors, the importance of this distinction is clear when one
considers the power the Court has given the government in public
schools. For example, even though schools can punish students with
school-related sanctions like suspension and expulsion for speech
that substantially disrupts school activities or encourages drug use,
the Court has never suggested that the First Amendment would
permit the government to prosecute students for this speech.229
Pickering did not indicate that an employee’s intent was a rele-
vant factor in the balancing test it established, but the potential
importance of intent appears in two Supreme Court decisions invol-
ving national security information and government insiders. In
Haig v. Agee, the Court held that the “repeated disclosures of intel-
ligence operations and names of intelligence personnel” were unpro-
tected at least when an ex-CIA agent made these disclosures for
“the declared purpose of obstructing all intelligence operations and
the recruiting of intelligence personnel.”230 This statement leaves
open the possibility that disclosures made for the good faith purpose
of informing public debate might be entitled to protection, or at the
very least, it might be important to distinguish between those
publishers who act in good faith and those who do not. Similarly, in
United States v. Aguilar, the Court upheld the conviction of a
federal judge who revealed the contents of a wiretapping application
in violation of a statute that prohibits such disclosures when made
“in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent [the wiretapping] inter-
ception.”231 The Court specifically noted that in light of the statute’s
requirements, it was not necessary to engage in any “artificial
229. See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 534-37 (discussing the constitutional difference
between criminal and civil sanctions).
230. 453 U.S. 280, 309-10 (1981).
231. 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 2232(d)).
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narrowing” to accommodate First Amendment concerns.232 Although
Aguilar contains some language that is not favorable to the
argument that government insiders have a constitutional right to
reveal information obtained on the job—especially its comment that
some government officials “may have special duties of nondisclo-
sure”233—at a minimum the Court’s decision is contextually based.
Agee and Aguilar together indicate that the context of a disclo-
sure—including what is disclosed, to whom, and why—might make
a constitutional difference even with respect to government insiders.
B. The Role of Intent Generally
In First Amendment law, the speaker’s intent frequently plays a
major role in determining the availability and scope of constitution-
al protection,234 even though a speaker’s intent does not usually
have any impact on the harm that the speech might cause, or its
inherent value.
Intent appears throughout the Court’s free speech jurisprudence.
In some cases, the relevant intent relates to the speakers’ knowl-
edge of the true nature of the content of their speech.235 Distributors
cannot be held strictly liable for selling obscene materials;236 and
distributors of pornography are likewise protected unless they are
aware of, or are reckless, regarding the age of individuals depicted
in the photographs or videos they sell.237 Defamation claims against
public figures cannot survive without a showing that the speaker
acted with actual malice, defined not as ill will or spite toward the
subject of his speech but rather as knowledge or reckless indiffer-
ence regarding the truth or falsity of the challenged statements.238
232. Id. at 606.
233. Id.
234. For a more complete survey of intent requirements in the Court’s First Amendment
cases, see Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1633, 1640-48 (2013).
235. Schauer, supra note 6, at 220-21 (arguing that the First Amendment’s intent standard
is not different from intent standards through criminal and civil law that assume that a
defendant intends the ordinary and natural meaning of the words he uses).
236. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 148-49, 155 (1959).
237. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982).
238. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 69, 74 (1964) (criminal libel case involving public offi-
cials); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (civil libel case involving public
official plaintiff).
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The same actual malice standard applies to invasion of privacy
claims involving matters of public concern.239 These cases indicate
that the First Amendment requires a defendant to have at least
some knowledge of the true nature of the speech he is making, but
notably they do not require a showing that the defendant intended
to cause harm to the plaintiff.
In other instances, however, the Court has held or at least
suggested that the defendant’s intent to cause harm is a relevant
factor in determining the scope of constitutional protection. For
example, the Court has held that fraudulent statements are not pro-
tected under the First Amendment because they are made with the
intent to mislead, not simply because they are false.240 Similarly, in
United States v. Alvarez, a plurality of the Court stated that
“[w]here false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or
other valuable considerations, say offers of employment, it is well
established that the Government may restrict speech without af-
fronting the First Amendment.”241 Both the plurality and Justice
Breyer’s concurrence expressed concerns that giving the government
broad power to restrict intentional lies would have a tremendous
chilling effect on free speech.242 At the same time, in recognizing the
constitutionality of perjury statutes and laws forbidding the imper-
sonation of a government officer,243 the Court made clear that the
First Amendment does not always require that a speaker intend his
false speech to lead to a defined harm. Alvarez raises more ques-
tions than it answers, but at a minimum, Alvarez suggests that a
speaker who intends his communications to cause harm is less
239. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (applying actual malice standard to
statutory invasion of privacy claim involving matter of public concern).
240. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 621 (2003)
(rejecting challenge to fraud action alleging charitable organizations misled potential donors
about the amount of their donations that would be used for charitable endeavors because the
representations were “made with intent to mislead”).
241. 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (rejecting the government’s argument that under Court’s
precedents, intentional lies fall outside of the First Amendment).
242. See id. at 2548 (“The mere potential for the exercise of th[e] power [to penalize any
intentional lie] casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free speech,
thought, and discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom.”); see also id. at 2553
(Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he threat of criminal prosecution for making a false statement
can inhibit the speaker from making true statements, thereby ‘chilling’ a kind of speech that
lies at the First Amendment’s heart.”).
243. See id. at 2546 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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likely to be entitled to constitutional protection than those speakers
who do not.
Arguably the cases most relevant to the scope of First Amend-
ment protection for the unauthorized dissemination of national
security information are the Court’s incitement cases. The Court’s
earliest First Amendment cases involved this topic, and throughout
the twentieth century, the Court grappled with the question of when
the government could punish speech that incites unlawful conduct.
Along the way, the Court incorporated the speaker’s intent as a rele-
vant factor in determining the scope of constitutional protection.
In its initial cases, the Court held that the speaker’s intent to
bring about an unlawful end, combined with the “tendency” of the
speech to do just that, satisfied the requirements of the First
Amendment even if the unlawful conduct never came to pass. Jus-
tice Holmes, writing for the majority in Schenck v. United States,
suggested that as long as a defendant had the intent to bring about
an unlawful act, and the speech had a “tendency” to achieve that
end, success is not required.244 What exactly this requisite “intent”
was, however, was unclear. In Abrams v. United States, for example,
the Court upheld the conviction of several defendants who had dis-
tributed pamphlets criticizing the use of U.S. troops in Russia and
America’s efforts to interfere with the Russian revolution.245 The
Court concluded that the plain language of the pamphlets revealed
the defendant’s intent to interfere with the United States’ war
efforts.246 In his dissent, Justice Holmes disagreed with the major-
ity’s interpretation of the word “intent,” explaining that in “ordinary
legal discussion” intent simply means “knowledge at the time of the
act that the consequences said to be intended would ensue.”247 But
to satisfy the First Amendment, Justice Holmes argued, “intent”
244. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and
the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground for saying that success
alone warrants making the act a crime.”).
245. 250 U.S. 616, 616-17, 623-24 (1919). 
246. Id. at 624.
247. Id. at 626 (Holmes, J., dissenting). This definition is not quite the same as the
constructive intent embraced by the Ninth Circuit in Shaffer v. United States, in which the
court held that a defendant “must be presumed to have intended the natural and probable
consequences of what he knowingly did.” 255 F. 886, 889 (1919).
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should require evidence that “the “consequence is the aim of the
deed,” not simply knowledge that the consequence might follow.248
Another question was whether intent to incite unlawful conduct
would be, by itself, sufficient to support a conviction consistent with
the First Amendment. At times, Justice Holmes appeared to em-
brace this view. In his Abrams dissent, Holmes contended that “the
present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about”
would be sufficient to uphold the defendants’ conviction.249 In other
words, Justice Holmes would appear to permit criminal liability
based on either the presence of imminent unlawful acts or the intent
to inspire listeners to commit criminal acts. If the speech at issue
caused imminent unlawful behavior, the intent to incite people to
commit those acts was not necessary; on the flip side, intent to incite
is sufficient to support a conviction under Holmes’s view, even if the
speaker was completely unsuccessful.250
Under the Court’s current standard for incitement, a speaker’s
intent to cause unlawful conduct is insufficient standing alone to
support a conviction. Instead, the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio
provided the following test for constitutionally unprotected advocacy
of unlawful action: the advocacy must be “directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.”251 Arguably, under a plain-language reading of this
test, a speaker’s subjective intent is not relevant at all. The Court
did not use the word “intent”; instead, the Court used the phrase
“directed to,” which could simply require that a defendant use the
explicit or literal words of incitement, and that the only intent that
is relevant is that the speaker is assumed to have intended the
natural and most reasonable meaning of those words.252 But most
scholars have interpreted Brandenburg as requiring that the speak-
er must have subjectively intended to bring about the imminent
248. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 628 (emphasis added).
250. Kendrick, supra note 6, at 1263 (“Holmes posited intent not as a requirement but as
an alternative to the existence of a ‘present danger of immediate evil,’ which apparently
licensed punishment without regard for the speaker’s state of mind.”).
251. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
252. Schauer, supra note 6, at 218-20.
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lawless action,253 and the Court’s subsequent decisions have been
consistent with this view.254
The Court has been more explicit about the importance of intent
in protecting the right of association. In Scales v. United States, the
Court held that membership in a “subversive” organization could be
penalized only if the defendant was an “ ‘active’ member,” and “not
merely ‘a ... passive ... or purely technical’ member,” and that the de-
fendant had not just knowledge of the organization’s goals but the
“specific intent” to further those illegal ends.255 The Court explained
that this specific intent requirement was important because those
individuals who were members of subversive organizations but lack
the requisite intent to overthrow the government “may be foolish,
deluded, or perhaps merely optimistic,” but they were not crim-
inals.256
The Court’s more recent decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project curtailed the reach of the specific intent requirement in
Scales when the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a
federal law criminalizing the provision of material support to
designated terrorist groups.257 The Court held that a defendant need
not have the “specific intent” to further the goals of a designated
foreign terrorist organization, as the plaintiffs had argued in reli-
ance on Scales.258 Instead, the Court held that the First Amendment
was satisfied if the defendant knew that the organization was a
designated foreign terrorist organization and his actions were
“coordinated with or under the direction of ” the organization.259 In
253. Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling
Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 724 (1978) (discussing the intent requirement of the Brandenburg
test); e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 18 (1971) (holding that Cohen’s jacket stating
“Fuck the Draft” could not constitute incitement because “there [was] no showing of an intent
to incite disobedience to or disruption of the draft”).
254. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106-07, 109 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that
that defendant’s exclamation that “[w]e’ll take the fucking street later,” as police attempted
to move the crowd of demonstrators off the street so that vehicles could pass, was not incite-
ment because “there was no evidence, or rational inference from the import of the language,
that his words were intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder”); see also
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18 (appearing to embrace this view in holding that the speech on defendant’s
jacket was not fighting words). 
255. 367 U.S. 203, 205-06, 220 (1961).
256. Id. at 229-30.
257. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010).
258. Id. at 2718.
259. Id. at 2726.
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rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the statute was unconstitu-
tional under Scales because it lacked a specific intent requirement,
the Court reasoned that “[n]othing about Scales” indicated that such
an intent was necessary when the defendant had provided material
support to designated groups.260
The dissent criticized the majority for ignoring the requirements
of both Scales and Brandenburg.261 Notably, however, the Court was
careful to make clear the limits of its holding, explaining that “Con-
gress ha[d] avoided any restriction on independent advocacy” as well
as “any [other] activities not directed to, coordinated with, or con-
trolled by terrorist groups.”262 Even though the Court did not discuss
the scope of First Amendment protection for activities that might
aid terrorist groups but are not aimed at terrorist groups, Humani-
tarian Law Project at least suggests the possibility that a scienter
requirement might be necessary to punish such activities.263
Because the incitement cases exemplify the Court’s struggle to
balance free debate against safety and security, it is not surprising
that scholars examining the First Amendment right to disclosure of
national security information frequently embrace the Brandenburg
test. But most instances of unauthorized national security informa-
tion disclosures do not urge others to commit unlawful acts. Instead,
it might be best to examine the scope of First Amendment protection
for such speech by considering these disclosures as belonging to the
broad category of harm- or crime-facilitating speech. Communica-
tions falling into this category are those that “make [ ] it easier or
safer for listeners or readers ... to commit” bad acts.264 The constitu-
tional difficulty with this type of speech arises when the harm-
facilitating communication has both good and bad purposes, and
unfortunately, the Supreme Court has offered no direct guidance on
260. Id. at 2718.
261. Id. at 2733 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 2728 (majority opinion). 
263. Id. at 2720, 2722.
264. For a lengthy discussion of various types of speech that might fit into this category,
see Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1097-1103 (2005). Pro-
fessor Volokh agrees that “harm-facilitating speech” might be an accurate term to capture the
kind of speech with dual purposes, but he settles on “crime-facilitating speech” because most
of the speech he discusses involves the facilitation of crimes, and the term “harm” seems
“more concrete” because it “could include many harms, including offense, spiritual degrada-
tion, and more.” Id. at 1103 n.45.
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how to deal with such communications. The dissemination of nation-
al security information arguably falls within this tricky category
because it often involves speech that can be used for purposes that
are both good (informing public debate) and bad (aiding our enemies
or harming the United States).265
A mens rea requirement that requires merely knowledge that
information could be used for bad purposes would subject anyone
who shares that information to punishment.266 Concerns about the
ramifications of such a rule are weaker in contexts in which the
speaker shares the information with particular persons who are
likely to use that information improperly.267 Instead, the most obvi-
ous and potentially most powerful means of distinguishing between
speech with good and bad purposes is to examine the context of the
communication as well as the intent of the speaker.268 As with the
actual malice inquiry, a fact-finder would not be required to take a
defendant’s asserted purpose at face value. To judge the veracity of
a defendant’s good faith defense, the fact-finder could consider the
context in which national security information is shared, with a
specific focus on the intended audience and the precise nature of the
information revealed.
To be clear, the Supreme Court has not been consistent in its in-
vocation of intent standards in defining the scope of free speech
rights. In the context of national security information that poses a
serious and immediate threat of harm to our national security inter-
ests, the Court might very well conclude that good intentions are
irrelevant. After all, Pentagon Papers arguably suggests that even
prior restraints would be permissible in such circumstances,269 and
in Bartnicki, the Court was careful to mention that “interests of the
highest order” could strip innocent third-party speakers of First
Amendment protection.270 This does not mean that intent is
irrelevant in every case, but that in a small subcategory of cases,
speaker’s intent is not important.
265. Id. at 1115 (arguing that some disclosures of the government’s abuse of its police
powers “would indeed be valuable to political discourse when communicated to some listeners,
even if it’s harmful in the hands of others”).
266. Id. at 1175.
267. Id. at 1176.
268. Id. at 1179-81.
269. United States v. Wash. Post Co., 446 F. 2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
270. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001).
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Furthermore, the Court has not used intent standards consis-
tently. Although this might indicate that we should proceed
cautiously before adopting intent standards in yet another context,
the Court’s inconsistency might be a virtue. Rather than using the
same intent standard in every case, perhaps it would be most appro-
priate to incorporate different intent standards for government
insiders and outsiders. For example, it might better reflect the goals
of the First Amendment to focus on speakers’ mental states regard-
ing the content of the information for government insiders—the sort
of inquiry we see in Sullivan—but the intent to contribute to public
debate for government outsiders, as we see in the incitement cases.
The relevant inquiry for government insiders would not be whether
they acted with a “bad motive” to help the enemy (or, to put it
another way, a “good motive” to contribute to public debate), but
rather whether the speaker believed in good faith (even if incor-
rectly) that the information revealed government wrongdoing. The
benefit of focusing on the speaker’s mental state regarding the
content of the communicated information avoids the problems of
giving constitutional protection to all government insiders who spill
the nation’s secrets claiming they did so with the best of intentions.
III. OBJECTIONS TO IMPOSING AN INTENT STANDARD
As Part I demonstrated, incorporating intent standards into the
substantive definition of crimes relating to the dissemination of
national security information is not a new idea. Although the
current statutory regime is largely incoherent, the text of the rele-
vant statutes as well as the legislative history clearly indicates that
Congress has been aware of the usefulness of culpability standards
for over a century. Part II demonstrated that even though the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is unclear on when the First Amend-
ment requires some level of culpability, in many instances, the
Supreme Court has held that in order to preserve our nation’s
essential free speech values, the defendant must have knowledge
regarding the harmful content of his speech or intent to cause harm
with his speech. Nevertheless, the argument that it is important as
a matter of criminal law policy and constitutional law to incorporate
intent standards when criminalizing the unauthorized disclosure
and dissemination of national security information faces myriad
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objections. This Section attempts to address the most likely objec-
tions.
One of the most frequent objections to requiring a speaker’s
intent to cause harm is that intent should be irrelevant when the
harm is the same; the information will reach not only the American
public but our enemies as well.271 Foreigners read our papers, watch
our television programs, and search U.S. websites to obtain informa-
tion they would never be able to collect on their own.272 Given the
potentially serious consequences of any unauthorized disclosure of
national security information, some might argue, mens rea require-
ments should be as minimal as possible in order to discourage such
disclosures and to make it easier to prosecute those that do occur.273
As a factual matter, in some instances, there are differences in
the harm that spies and leakers cause. Because publishers often
keep the identity of their sources anonymous, foreigners may not
know whether the information in U.S. news sources is reliable.274
Another potentially relevant difference between spies and leakers
is that in the case of leaks, the United States has the benefit of
knowing what secrets are out, and the United States can respond
accordingly.275 In some rare cases, foreign nations or political groups
271. See, e.g., Espionage Act Hearing, supra note 8, at 3 (noting that a motive requirement
might be a useful way of distinguishing “the conduct of individuals like Julian Assange from
the actions ... of the New York Times,” but the defendant’s motive does not change the harm
resulting from the disclosure of national security information); Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra
note 2, at 934 (“[S]ecurity is, by and large, equally compromised by the publication of secrets
in newspapers or magazines available to all as it is by their transfer to foreign spies in
encoded microdots.”); Volokh, supra note 264, at 1192 (comparing two reporters who publish
records about secret subpoenas of library records and arguing that because the “bad motiva-
tion” of one reporter to interfere with the investigation does not decrease the value or increase
the harm of his article, “[t]he ability of dual-use crime-facilitating speech to contribute to the
exchange of facts and ideas is likewise independent of whether it’s motivated by a bad
purpose”).
272. See Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 1083 (“In our reasonably open society,
Congress and the newspapers reveal large amounts of defense information that would be diffi-
cult and exceedingly expensive for interested foreign governments to collect on their own.”).
273. See Jonathan L. Hood, What is Reasonable Cause to Believe?: The Mens Rea Required
for Conviction Under 21 U.S.C. § 841, 30 PACE L. REV. 1360, 1365-67, 1369-70, 1376 (2010)
(arguing that an objective mens rea is generally preferred for crimes with “serious
repercussions” to discourage government officials from engaging in harmful behavior, and to
ease the prosecutorial burden”).
274. Of course the same problem could arise with spies, who might be double agents.
275. That said, changing course might be easier in the case of “easily altered contingency
plans” than it would be when a leaker reveals “blueprints for entrenched weapons systems.”
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might not notice national security information published in a news-
paper, a magazine, or online. The most famous example of this
occurred in 1942, when the Japanese failed to read a story in the
Chicago Tribune revealing that the United States had broken the
Japanese code.276
But lumping all unauthorized disclosures together ignores a more
fundamental problem. Democracies are inherently open societies,
and the free flow of information about our government to both citi-
zens and foreigners alike is “a necessary consequence of the nation’s
deepest values.”277 This does not mean that we give up all hope of
preventing the exposure of our most sensitive secrets, but it does
mean that the disclosure of some national security secrets is not
only inevitable but also essential for the proper functioning of our
government. As I have discussed elsewhere at greater length, leaks
play a crucial—albeit imperfect—role in checking executive pow-
er.278 Grouping all leaks together, and criminalizing them, would
provide the executive branch with undue control over the flow of
national security information to the public.
In addition, it is important to recognize that the unauthorized
disclosure of national security information can have both harmful
and valuable effects.279 It is truly “dual-use” information. For
example, information that reveals gaps in security may alert “bad”
people about our vulnerabilities, but this same information may
have political value because it reveals that the government is not
doing enough to protect us.280 Allowing these sorts of disclosures
may not only stimulate officials to take additional security precau-
tions, but may also provide us with a genuine sense of security
based on our confidence that the press would expose any weak-
nesses.281 Information about government misconduct that is illegal
Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 2, at 934.
276. Editorial, The Battle of Midway—A Secrets Storm, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 11, 2013), http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-11/opinion/ct-edit-midway-20130811_1_tribune-tower-
secrets-u-s-navy [http://perma.cc/SYB9-6DF7].
277. Id. at 1083.
278. See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 464-82.
279. Id. at 481; Volokh, supra note 264, at 1115 (publishing secret information may be
“valuable to political discourse when communicated to some listeners, even if it’s harmful in
the hands of others”).
280. Volokh, supra note 264, at 1119.
281. Id. at 1120.
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or conduct likely to be regarded by the public as excessive may give
the targets of these programs the opportunity to avoid surveillance,
but the disclosures will spur public debate about the programs.282
More detailed disclosures are potentially more useful to our ene-
mies, but they are also more likely to contribute to a meaningful
public debate.283
Even those who appreciate that all leaks are not alike object that
“inquiries into subjective intent and personal motivation are usually
fruitless—and often dangerous.”284 Determining whether someone
acted for selfish or altruistic reasons is notoriously difficult.285 One
problem with focusing on the purpose—or motivation—for disclo-
sures is that leakers, as well as spies, can have any number of
reasons for their disclosures that have nothing to do with a desire
to harm the United States, such as financial gain, sexual gratifica-
tion, ideological affinity, or a desire for excitement.286 This objection
is well taken and reveals the tricky distinction between a speaker’s
intent and motivation. The best response to this objection is to point
out that a number of criminal statutes already require the govern-
ment to prove that defendants have acted with the requisite intent;
incorporating intent standards into national security disclosure
statutes would not be all that unusual.
Instead of inquiring into a defendant’s actual mens rea, one
alternative approach is to consider potential proxies for good in-
tentions. One such suggestion is to offer no protection to those
individuals who disclose national security information anonymous-
ly. Rahul Sagar, along with others, have argued that those who act
in good faith to reveal information in service of the public interest
should be willing to accept the consequences for their disclosures.287
282. Id. at 1122-23.
283. Id. at 1121.
284. Stone, supra note 8, at 216.
285. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 676 n.12 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The
distinction between pure altruism and self-interest has puzzled philosophers for centuries;
there is no reason to believe that courts and administrative law judges will have an easier
time with it.”).
286. See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 489 (detailing various potential motivations for
espionage). 
287. RAHUL SAGAR, SECRETS AND LEAKS 134 (2013) (“Requiring a whistleblower to be
willing to disclose her identity makes it less likely that even those officials who have good
intentions will blow the whistle.”).
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Sagar’s argument echoes a familiar assumption regarding civil
disobedience.288
But is it really true that willingness to risk personal and profes-
sional loss is an accurate proxy for a desire to serve the public
interest? Whistleblowers are often ostracized and lose their jobs,
families, and friends. The willingness to face the ostracism that
often accompanies exposure is more likely a good proxy for foolhar-
diness than it is for willingness to serve the public interest. Grant-
ing protection only to those willing to accept the consequences would
have a severe chilling effect on leaks because very few people would
be willing to take that risk. Indeed, even Sagar would relax the
requirement of exposure in cases involving “gross misconduct”
because the public’s interest in this information is “overriding.”289
Although Professor Sagar’s approach is flawed, his implicit sug-
gestion that the context of leaks should matter makes sense. Any
inquiry into a defendant’s subjective intent will not take the
defendant’s protestations of innocence as the final word on the
issue. Instead, it is essential for a fact-finder to consider the nature
of the information revealed and to whom it is revealed in evaluating
the intent of the speaker.
Another objection is that although an intent requirement may be
“logically or morally compelling,” it is nevertheless likely to offer de-
fendants very little protection in practice.290 This concern is par-
ticularly apt during wartime or other hostilities, when those who
disclose sensitive national security information are frequently
labeled unpatriotic traitors.291 The problem during the early Espio-
nage Act prosecutions was that judges “allow[ed] juries to infer
specific intent from the bare possibility that the speaker might have
had such an intent.”292 Furthermore, it is easier to present an out-
sider—like Julian Assange—as having a “bad purpose” to harm the
288. See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 484 n.210 (citing various scholars, including John
Rawls, who have argued that true whistleblowers accept that the law will offer them no
protection).
289. SAGAR, supra note 287, at 137-38.
290. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Origins of the “Bad Tendency” Test: Free Speech in
Wartime, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 448 (“[A] standard based primarily on intent, however
logical or morally satisfying, fails in practice.”).
291. Id. (“[I]t is especially dangerous to undertake [an intent] inquiry when jurors, and
even some judges, are already inflamed against the defendant because of his ‘disloyalty.’”).
292. Id. at 425.
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United States.293 The Supreme Court has itself recognized the
potential futility of intent standards. In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, in which the Court established the actual malice standard,
the Court was so concerned that the Alabama courts would reach
the exact same decision on remand even with an actual malice
requirement that the Supreme Court went out of its way to make
clear that the current record would not support a new trial.294
The first response to this objection is that it fails to appreciate
that intent is not the only relevant element of a crime of unautho-
rized disclosure. Although in its early incitement cases the Court—
including sometimes Justice Holmes—suggested that intent to
cause harm, standing alone, would be sufficient to satisfy any First
Amendment concerns, the Court has long since moved past that
position.295 This Article is concerned with whether intent places an
additional limitation on the government’s ability to restrict the
disclosures of national security information, not whether some level
of intent standing alone would satisfy constitutional concerns.
Intent would be an element that must be proven over and above
other elements of the crime. For example, it would be very problem-
atic if Congress were to criminalize the unauthorized disclosure of
national security information whenever it happens to be classified,
or whenever the information could be “potentially damaging” to the
nation’s security interests. As one judge has noted, a “potentially
damaging” standard has an incredibly broad sweep because “[o]ne
may wonder whether any information shown to be related somehow
to national defense could fail to have at least some such ‘poten-
tial.’ ”296 Instead, a more appropriate approach might be to allow the
government a presumption that classified information is properly
classified, but allow a leaker to demonstrate that the information
was improperly classified or that the information reveals govern-
ment wrongdoing.297
293. Wells, supra note 8, at 62.
294. 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Story of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 229, 251 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman
eds., 2012).
295. Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 663
(2009).
296. United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1086 (4th Cir. 1988) (Phillips, J., concurring).
297. It would be insufficient to allow defendants to demonstrate only that the information
should never have been classified, although that would be an improvement over the current
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Another response to concerns that an intent standard would be
meaningless is to remind objectors that appellate courts would be
required to review the lower court’s intent findings, and as in the
defamation context, this review could be de novo. Of course, appel-
late review hardly offers a perfect response to this problem, given
that appellate judges can likewise be caught up in the wartime fears
and patriotic fever that grip the nation at large. The Court’s record
since September 11, 2001, however, indicates that the Court is well
aware of the mistakes it has made in the past (like Korematsu v.
United States298) and capable of reviewing national security issues
with the requisite detachment.299
In order to determine the subjective mindset of a discloser, the
decision maker will necessarily have to consider various types of
objective evidence. As in the context of defamation cases, when the
plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the defendant
published the challenged statements with actual malice, the defen-
dant’s self-serving statements are not taken at their word.300
Instead, fact-finders routinely examine all the circumstances sur-
rounding the publication decision. In the context of national security
information disclosures, the same sort of inquiry would take place.
Indeed, in some ways the dichotomy between subjective and objec-
tive intentions is false because any analysis of subjective purposes
will involve the analysis of objective factors.301
Some objections to the incorporation of intent standards are spe-
cific to government insiders. Many have argued—and even the
Supreme Court has suggested in Snepp—that government employ-
ees and contractors have waived any First Amendment rights they
state of the law, because the current classification system does not forbid the classification
of information relating to illegal government activities. See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 477
(explaining that current executive classification orders prohibit the classification of informa-
tion that pertains to “violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error,” or classification
of embarrassing information, but only when the classification was done with the intent of
concealing wrongdoing or embarrassment).
298. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
299. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (“[D]ue process demands that
a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity
to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.”).
300. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 283 (1964).
301. See, e.g., Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 641 (1947) (holding that a jury could
consider evidence to determine whether defendant had requisite intent to adhere to the
enemy when he assisted his son, a German saboteur).
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might have to reveal national security information they receive on
the job, whether explicitly (by signing non-disclosure agreements)
or implicitly (by accepting the job and undertaking a position of
trust). These arguments prove too much. Government insiders who
sign nondisclosure agreements arguably lack bargaining position
and full knowledge of the import of their decision to sign such
agreements. Although no one is required to take a government job,
this argument ignores reality to contend that government insiders
have a real “choice” about whether to sign a nondisclosure agree-
ment. In addition, government employees must do so before
receiving access to any confidential information. Although it is likely
that many government employees are aware of the possibility that
they might receive access to information that is in some way
disquieting, the fact remains that insiders do not sign these
agreements knowing precisely what information they will receive
and what sort of moral quandary forced silence will impose on them.
Furthermore, there should be nothing magical about contracts of
silence, particularly when the government is one of the signatories.
As a matter of contract law, some contracts are plainly unenforce-
able because they violate public policy. For example, contracts to
perform a crime or tortious conduct are generally unenforceable.302
Contracts to conceal criminal or tortious activity might sometimes
be enforceable, but in most situations they are not.303 I have already
addressed the relevant contract and agency law principles at length
in another article,304 and it is sufficient to state here that while the
public policy exception to contract law is certainly limited, it does
exist and could come into play in a number of leak cases, particular-
ly those that reveal criminal or tortious wrongdoing. The existence
of a contract does not eliminate all public policy and First Amend-
ment concerns.
Professor Leslie Kendrick has argued that the strict enforceability
of nondisclosure agreements is constitutional because government
insiders are punished for “non-message-related harm[s],” rather 
302. Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 295 (1998) (pointing out that “hit-man” contracts are plainly
unenforceable); id. at 325 (noting that contracts to commit tortious acts are unenforceable).
303. See id. at 307-12.
304. See Papandrea, supra note 1, at 520-33.
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than the content of the leaks themselves.305 The idea is that the gov-
ernment needs to protect against the disclosure of sensitive
information because it would inhibit the proper functioning of
government not to enforce such contracts strictly. In other words,
the government has very good reasons for demanding secrecy from
its employees and contractors; its ability to function would be in
jeopardy if its confidentiality requirements were not enforceable.
This argument is compelling if we were considering a facial attack
on all government nondisclosure agreements. But it overstates the
case in the context of as-applied challenges.306 The decision to
prosecute one leak rather than the (hundreds of) others is not a
content-neutral decision.
CONCLUSION
The public dialogue about the Snowden and Manning leaks, the
struggles of Congress and the lower courts to incorporate intent
standards in cases involving disclosures of national security infor-
mation, and the Supreme Court’s attention to the role of intent in
protecting essential First Amendment rights demonstrate that the
intent of the leaker is important as a matter of common sense, pub-
lic policy, and constitutional law. As Robert Post once noted (albeit
in a different context), the argument that intent should not matter
is “remarkable” given that “in ordinary life our assessment of the
meaning and value of speech often depends upon our understanding
of the purposes or intentions of a speaker.”307
305. Kendrick, supra note 6, at 1283.
306. Professor Fred Zacharias makes a similar argument distinguishing facial and as
applied attacks in the context of lawyer confidentiality rules. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentiality II: Is Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 601, 611 (1990)
(“Employing facial analysis—like categorizing—makes it far easier to support a rule that only
sometimes works.”).
307. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 152 (1995).
       
